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Jennings v. Rodriguez
15-1204
Ruling Below: Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015)
Rodriguez sought relief on behalf of himself and others detained for more than six months
without bond hearing during immigration proceedings. The requested relief constituted
individualized bond hearings with burden on government. The district court denied the petition.
Rodriguez appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court,
entered preliminary injunction. The government appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The
District Court granted summary judgment to class and entered permanent injunction. Parties
appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Question Presented: Whether aliens subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)
must be afforded bond hearings if detention lasts six months;
Whether aliens who fall under the mandatory detention provisions of Section 1226(c) must be
afforded the same;
Whether the government must demonstrate that the alien is a flight risk or a danger to the
community in order to deny release on bond;
Whether the length of detention must be weighed in the decision to release on bond;
Whether new bond hearings must be afforded every six months.

Alejandro RODRIGUEZ; Abdirizak Aden Farah; Jose Farias Cornejo; Yussuf Abdikadir;
Abel Perez Ruelas, for themselves and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals,
Petitioners–Appellees/Cross–Appellants,
and
Efren Orozco, Petitioner,
v.
Timothy ROBBINS, Field Office Director, Los Angeles District, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Homeland Security; Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney
General; Wesley Lee, Assistant Field Office Director, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Rodney Penner, Captain, Mira Loma Detention Center; Sandra Hutchens,
Sheriff of Orange County; Nguyen, Officer, Officer–in–Charge, Theo Lacy Facility;
Davis Nighswonger, Captain, Commander, Theo Lacy Facility; Respondents–
Appellants/Cross–Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Decided on October 28, 2015
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[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:
This is the latest decision in our decade-long
examination of civil, i.e. non-punitive and
merely preventative, detention in the
immigration context. As we noted in our
prior decision in this case, Rodriguez v.
Robbins, thousands of immigrants to the
United States are locked up at any given time,
awaiting the conclusion of administrative and
judicial proceedings that will determine
whether they may remain in this country. In
2014, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) removed 315,943
individuals, many of whom were detained
during the removal process. According to the
most recently available statistics, ICE detains
more than 429,000 individuals over the
course of a year, with roughly 33,000
individuals in detention on any given day.
Alejandro Rodriguez, Abdirizak Aden Farah,
Jose Farias Cornejo, Yussuf Abdikadir, Abel
Perez
Ruelas,
and
Efren
Orozco
(“petitioners”) represent a certified class of
noncitizens who challenge their prolonged
detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b),
1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a) without
individualized
bond
hearings
and
determinations to justify their continued
detention. Their case is now on appeal for the
third time. After a three-judge panel of our
court reversed the district court's denial of
petitioners' motion for class certification, and
after our decision affirming the district
court's entry of a preliminary injunction, the
district court granted summary judgment to
the class and entered a permanent injunction.
Under the permanent injunction, the
government must provide any class member
who is subject to “prolonged detention”—six
months or more—with a bond hearing before
an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). At that hearing,

the government must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the detainee is a
flight risk or a danger to the community to
justify the denial of bond. The government
appeals from that judgment. We affirm in
part and reverse in part.
I. Background
On May 16, 2007, Alejandro Garcia
commenced this case by filing a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the Central District
of California. Garcia's case was consolidated
with a similar case filed by Alejandro
Rodriguez, and the petitioners moved for
class certification. The motion was denied on
March 21, 2008.
A three-judge panel of our court reversed the
district court's order denying class
certification. We held that the proposed class
satisfied each requirement of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23: The government
conceded that the class was sufficiently
numerous; each class member's claim turned
on the common question of whether
detention for more than six months without a
bond hearing raises serious constitutional
concerns;
Rodriguez's
claims
were
sufficiently typical of the class's because “the
determination of whether [he] is entitled to a
bond hearing will rest largely on
interpretation of the statute authorizing his
detention”; and Rodriguez, through his
counsel, adequately represented the class.
The panel also noted that “any concern that
the differing statutes authorizing detention of
the various class members will render class
adjudication of class members' claims
impractical
or
undermine
effective
representation of the class” could be
addressed through “the formation of
subclasses.”
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The government petitioned our court for
panel rehearing or rehearing en banc. In
response, the panel amended the opinion to
expand its explanation of why the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) does not bar
certification of the class and, with that
amendment, unanimously voted to deny the
government's petition. The full court was
advised of the suggestion for rehearing en
banc, and no judge requested a vote on
whether to rehear the matter. The government
did not file a petition for certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court.
On remand, the district court certified a class
defined as:
“…all non-citizens within the
Central District of California who: (1)
are or were detained for longer than
six months pursuant to one of the
general
immigration
detention
statutes pending completion of
removal proceedings, including
judicial review, (2) are not and have
not been detained pursuant to a
national security detention statute,
and (3) have not been afforded a
hearing to determine whether their
detention is justified.”
The district court also approved the proposed
subclasses, which correspond to the four
statutes under which the class members are
detained—8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a),
1226(c), and 1231(a). The class does not
include suspected terrorists, who are detained
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1537. Additionally,
because the class is defined as non-citizens
who are detained “pending completion of
removal proceedings,” it excludes any
detainee subject to a final order of removal.
On September 13, 2012, the district court
entered a preliminary injunction that applied

to class members detained pursuant to two of
these four “general immigration detention
statutes”— §§ 1225(b) and 1226(c). Under
the preliminary injunction, the government
was required to “provide each [detainee] with
a bond hearing” before an IJ and to “release
each Subclass member on reasonable
conditions of supervision ... unless the
government shows by clear and convincing
evidence that continued detention is justified
based on his or her danger to the community
or risk of flight.”
The government appealed, and on April 16,
2013, we affirmed. We applied the Court's
preliminary injunction standard set forth in
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., which requires the petitioner to
“establish that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that
the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
that an injunction is in the public interest.”
Evaluating petitioners' likelihood of success
on the merits, we began with the premise that
“[f]reedom
from
imprisonment—from
government custody, detention, or other
forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart
of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause
protects.” “Thus, the Supreme Court has held
that the indefinite detention of a onceadmitted alien ‘would raise serious
constitutional concerns.’ ”
Addressing those concerns, we recognized
that we were not writing on a clean slate:
“[I]n a series of decisions since 2001, ‘the
Supreme Court and this court have grappled
in piece-meal fashion with whether the
various immigration detention statutes may
authorize indefinite or prolonged detention of
detainees and, if so, may do so without
providing a bond hearing.’ ” First, in
Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court
resolved statutory and due process challenges
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to indefinite detention under 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6), which governs detention beyond
the ninety-day removal period, where
removal was not practicable—for one
petitioner because he was stateless, and for
another because his home country had no
repatriation treaty with the United States.
Drawing on civil commitment jurisprudence,
the Court reasoned:
A statute permitting indefinite detention of an
alien would raise a serious constitutional
problem. The Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause forbids the Government to
“depriv[e]” any “person ... of ... liberty ...
without due process of law.” Freedom from
imprisonment—from government custody,
detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that
Clause protects. And this Court has said that
government detention violates that Clause
unless the detention is ordered in a criminal
proceeding with adequate procedural
protections, or, in certain special and
“narrow” nonpunitive “circumstances,”
where a special justification, such as harmthreatening mental illness, outweighs the
“individual's
constitutionally protected
interest in avoiding physical restraint.” To
avoid
those
“serious
constitutional
concerns,” the Court held that § 1231(a)(6)
does not authorize indefinite detention
without a bond hearing. Noting that the
“proceedings at issue here are civil, not
criminal,” the Court “construe[d] the statute
to contain an implicit ‘reasonable time’
limitation,” and recognized six months as a
“presumptively reasonable period of
detention.”
Although in dissent, Justice Kennedy, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, disagreed with
the majority's application of the canon of
constitutional avoidance and argued that the
holding would improperly interfere with

international
repatriation
negotiations,
Justice Kennedy recognized that “both
removable and inadmissible aliens are
entitled to be free from detention that is
arbitrary or capricious.” Justice Kennedy
further noted that although the government
may detain non-citizens “when necessary to
avoid the risk of flight or danger to the
community,” due process requires “adequate
procedures to review their cases, allowing
persons once subject to detention to show that
through rehabilitation, new appreciation of
their responsibilities, or under *1068 other
standards, they no longer present special risks
or danger if put at large.”
Second, in Demore v. Kim, the Court
addressed a due process challenge to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c), which applies to non-citizens
convicted of certain crimes. After discussing
Congress's
reasons
for
establishing
mandatory detention, namely, high rates of
crime and flight by removable non-citizens,
the Court affirmed its “longstanding view
that the Government may constitutionally
detain deportable aliens during the limited
period necessary for their removal
proceedings.” Distinguishing Zadvydas, the
Court in Demore stressed that detention
under § 1226(c) has “a definite termination
point” and typically “lasts for less than the 90
days we considered presumptively valid in
Zadvydas.” Although the Court therefore
upheld mandatory detention under § 1226(c),
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, which
created the majority, reasoned that “a lawful
permanent resident alien such as respondent
could be entitled to an individualized
determination as to his risk of flight and
dangerousness if the continued detention
became unreasonable or unjustified.”
After Zadvydas and Demore, our court
decided several cases that provided further
guidance for our analysis in Rodriguez II. In
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Tijani v. Willis, we held that the
constitutionality of detaining a lawful
permanent resident under § 1226(c) for over
32 months was “doubtful.” “To avoid
deciding the constitutional issue, we
interpret[ed] the authority conferred by §
1226(c) as applying to expedited removal of
criminal aliens” and held that “[t]wo years
and eight months of process is not
expeditious.” We therefore remanded Tijani's
habeas petition to the district court with
directions to grant the writ unless the
government provided a bond hearing before
an IJ within sixty days.
We next considered civil detention in the
immigration context in Casas–Castrillon v.
Department of Homeland Security (Casas ).
There, a lawful permanent resident who had
been detained for nearly seven years under §
1226(c) and then § 1226(a) sought habeas
relief while his petition for review of his
removal order was pending before our court.
Applying Demore, we reasoned that §
1226(c) “authorize [s] mandatory detention
only for the ‘limited period of [the noncitizen's] removal proceedings,’ which the
Court estimated ‘lasts roughly a month and a
half in the vast majority of cases in which it
is invoked, and about five months in the
minority of cases in which the alien chooses
to appeal’ his removal order to the [Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) ].” We
therefore concluded that § 1226(c)'s
mandatory detention provision applies only
during
administrative
removal
proceedings—i.e. until the BIA affirms a
removal order. From that point until the
circuit court has “rejected [the applicant's]
final petition for review or his time to seek
such review expires,” the government has
discretionary authority to detain the noncitizen pursuant to § 1226(a). We noted,
however, that “[t]here is a difference between
detention being authorized and being
necessary as to any particular person.”

Because the Court's holding in Demore
turned on the brevity of mandatory detention
under § 1226(c), we concluded that “the
government may not detain a legal permanent
resident such as Casas for a prolonged period
without providing him a neutral forum in
which to contest the necessity of his
continued detention.”
Soon after, in Singh v. Holder, we clarified
the procedural requirements for bond
hearings held pursuant to our decision in
Casas (“Casas hearings”). In light of “the
substantial liberty interest at stake,” we held
that
“due
process
requires
a
contemporaneous record of Casas hearings,”
and that the government bears the burden of
proving “by clear and convincing evidence
that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the
community to justify denial of bond.” To
evaluate whether the government has met its
burden, we instructed IJs to consider the
factors set forth in In re Guerra, in particular
“the alien's criminal record, including the
extensiveness of criminal activity, the
recency of such activity, and the seriousness
of the offenses.”
Finally, in Diouf v. Napolitano, we extended
the procedural protections established in
Casas to individuals detained under §
1231(a)(6). We held that “prolonged
detention under § 1231(a)(6), without
adequate procedural protections,” like
prolonged detention under § 1226(a), “would
raise ‘serious constitutional concerns.’ ” To
address those concerns, we held that “an alien
facing prolonged detention under §
1231(a)(6) is entitled to a bond hearing
before an immigration judge and is entitled to
be released from detention unless the
government establishes that the alien poses a
risk of flight or a danger to the community.”
In Diouf II, we also adopted a definition of
“prolonged” detention—detention that “has
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lasted six months and is expected to continue
more than minimally beyond six months”—
for purposes of administering the Casas bond
hearing requirement. We reasoned that:
“When detention crosses the sixmonth threshold and release or
removal is not imminent, the private
interests at stake are profound.
Furthermore, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of liberty in the absence
of a hearing before a neutral
decisionmaker is substantial. The
burden imposed on the government
by requiring hearings before an
immigration judge at this stage of the
proceedings is therefore a reasonable
one.”
Applying these precedents to Rodriguez class
members detained under § 1226(c), which
requires civil detention of non-citizens
previously convicted of certain crimes who
have already served their state or federal
periods of incarceration, we have concluded
that “the prolonged detention of an alien
without an individualized determination of
his dangerousness or flight risk would be
constitutionally doubtful.” To avoid these
constitutional concerns, we held that “ §
1226(c)'s mandatory language must be
construed ‘to contain an implicit reasonable
time limitation, the application of which is
subject to federal-court review.’ ” “[W]hen
detention becomes prolonged,” i.e., at the
six-month mark, “ § 1226(c) becomes
inapplicable”; the government's authority to
detain the non-citizen shifts to § 1226(a),
which provides for discretionary detention;
and detainees are then entitled to bond
hearings.
In so holding, we rejected the government's
attempt to distinguish Casas on the basis that
“Casas concerned an alien who had received
an administratively final removal order,

sought judicial review, and obtained a
remand to the BIA,” whereas this case
involves “aliens awaiting the conclusion of
their initial administrative proceedings.” We
found that this argument reflected “a
distinction without a difference”: “
‘Regardless of the stage of the proceedings,
the same important interest is at stake—
freedom from prolonged detention.’ ”
We also noted that our conclusion was
consistent with the decisions of the two other
circuits that have directly addressed this
issue. In Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, the
Third Circuit, applying the canon of
constitutional avoidance, construed § 1226(c)
to “authorize [ ] detention for a reasonable
amount of time, after which the authorities
must make an individualized inquiry into
whether detention is still necessary to fulfill
the statute's purposes of ensuring that an alien
attends removal proceedings and that his
release will not pose a danger to the
community.” Applying that holding to the
facts of the case, the Third Circuit held that
the petitioner's detention, which had lasted
nearly three years, “was unconstitutionally
unreasonable and, therefore, a violation of
the Due Process Clause.” Although the court
declined to adopt a categorical definition of a
“reasonable amount of time” to detain a noncitizen without a bond hearing, it read
Demore as we do—to connect the
constitutionality of detention to its length and
to authorize detention only for a “limited
time.”
Likewise, in Ly v. Hansen, the Sixth Circuit
held that, to avoid a constitutional problem,
removable non-citizens may be detained
under § 1226(c) only “for a reasonable period
of time required to initiate and conclude
removal proceedings promptly.” Finding that
the petitioner's 500–day–long detention was
“unreasonable,” the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court's grant of a writ of habeas
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corpus. While maintaining that a “bright-line
time limitation, as imposed in Zadvydas,
would not be appropriate for the pre-removal
period,” the court recognized that Demore's
holding “rel[ies] on the fact that Kim, and
persons like him, will normally have their
proceedings completed within a short period
of time and will actually be deported, or will
be released.”
As to the Rodriguez subclass detained under
§ 1225(b), we found “no basis for
distinguishing
between”
non-citizens
detained under that section and under §
1226(c). The cases relied upon by the
government for the proposition that arriving
aliens are entitled to lesser due process
protections—namely, Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei and Barrera–Echavarria
v. Rison—were decided under pre-IIRIRA
law and, as such, were inapposite. We
therefore held that “to the extent detention
under § 1225(b) is mandatory, it is implicitly
time-limited.” As we had with § 1226(c), we
explained that “the government's detention
authority does not completely dissipate at six
months; rather, the mandatory provisions of
§ 1225(b) simply expire at six months, at
which point the government's authority to
detain the non-citizen would shift to §
1226(a), which is discretionary and which we
have already held requires a bond hearing.”
After establishing that class members
detained under § 1226(c) and § 1225(b) are
entitled to bond hearings after six months of
detention, we clarified that the procedural
requirements set forth in Singh apply to those
hearings. These requirements include
proceedings before “a neutral IJ” at which
“the government bear[s] the burden of proof
by clear and convincing evidence,” a lower
burden of proof than that required to sustain
a criminal charge.

Having found that the class was likely to
succeed on the merits, we turned to the other
preliminary injunction factors. We found that
the class members “clearly face irreparable
harm in the absence of the preliminary
injunction” because “the deprivation of
constitutional
rights
unquestionably
constitutes
irreparable
injury.”
The
preliminary
injunction
safeguards
constitutional rights by ensuring that
“individuals whom the government cannot
prove constitute a flight risk or a danger to
public safety, and sometimes will not succeed
in removing at all, are not needlessly
detained.” Similarly, we found that the
balance of equities favored the class
members because “needless prolonged
detention” imposes “major hardship,”
whereas the government “cannot suffer harm
from an injunction that merely ends an
unlawful practice or reads a statute as
required to avoid constitutional concerns.”
Finally, we held that the preliminary
injunction was consistent with the public
interest, which is “implicated when a
constitutional right has been violated,” and
“benefits from a preliminary injunction that
ensures that federal statutes are construed and
implemented in a manner that avoids serious
constitutional questions.” We therefore
affirmed the district court's order.
During the pendency of Rodriguez II, the
parties conducted discovery, and class
counsel adduced extensive evidence detailing
the circumstances under which class
members are detained. The parties then filed
cross-motions for summary judgment, and
the petitioners moved for a permanent
injunction to extend and expand the
preliminary injunction.
On August 6, 2013, after we issued our
decision in Rodriguez II, the district court
granted summary judgment to the class
members and entered a permanent injunction.
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The permanent injunction applies to class
members detained under any of the four civil
“general immigration detention statutes”—
§§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a)—
and requires the government to provide each
detainee with a bond hearing by his 195th day
of detention. Applying our decisions in
Casas, Singh, and Rodriguez II, the district
court further ordered that bond hearings
occur automatically, that detainees receive
“comprehendible
notice,”
that
the
government bear the burden of proving “by
clear and convincing evidence that a detainee
is a flight risk or a danger to the community
to justify the denial of bond,” and that
hearings are recorded. However, the district
court declined to order IJs to consider the
length of detention or the likelihood of
removal during bond hearings, or to provide
periodic hearings for detainees who are not
released after their first hearing.

bond hearings; they argue that the district
court erred in declining to require that IJs
consider the likelihood of removal and the
total length of detention, and in declining to
require that non-citizens detained for twelve
or more months receive periodic bond
hearings every six months.

The government now appeals from the entry
of the permanent injunction, arguing that the
district court—and we—erred in applying the
canon of constitutional avoidance to each of
the statutes at issue. Relying on the Supreme
Court's decisions in Zadvydas and Demore,
the government argues that none of the
subclasses are categorically entitled to bond
hearings after six months of detention.
Accordingly, the government contends that
we should decertify the class and instead
permit as-applied challenges to individual
instances of prolonged detention, which
could occur only through habeas
proceedings. Petitioners counter that
Rodriguez II is the law of the case and law of
the circuit, requiring us to affirm the
permanent injunction as to the § 1225(b) and
§ 1226(c) subclasses, and that non-citizens
detained pursuant to § 1226(a) and § 1231(a)
are entitled to bond hearings for reasons
similar to those discussed in Rodriguez II.
Petitioners cross-appeal the district court's
order as to the procedural requirements for

Non-citizens who vigorously pursue claims
for relief from removal face substantially
longer detention periods than those who
concede removability. Requesting relief from
an IJ increases the duration of class members'
detention by an average of two months;
appealing a claim to the BIA adds, on
average, another four months; and appealing
a BIA decision to the Ninth Circuit typically
leads to an additional eleven months of
confinement. Class members who persevere
through this lengthy process are often
successful: About 71% of class members
have sought relief from removal, and roughly
one-third of those individuals prevailed.
However, many detainees choose to give up
meritorious claims and voluntarily leave the
country instead of enduring years of
immigration detention awaiting a judicial
finding of their lawful status.

II. Nature of Civil Immigration Detention
Class members spend, on average, 404 days
in immigration detention. Nearly half are
detained for more than one year, one in five
for more than eighteen months, and one in ten
for more than two years. In some cases,
detention has lasted much longer: As of April
28, 2012, when the government generated
data to produce to the petitioners, one class
member had been detained for 1,585 days,
approaching four and a half years of civil
confinement.

Class members frequently have strong ties to
this country: Many immigrated to the United
States as children, obtained legal permanent
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resident status, and lived in this country for
as long as twenty years before ICE initiated
removal proceedings. As a result, hundreds
of class members are married to U.S. citizens
or lawful permanent residents, and have
children who were born in this country.
Further, many class members hold steady
jobs—including as electricians, auto
mechanics, and roofers—to provide for
themselves and their families. At home, they
are caregivers for young children, aging
parents, and sick or disabled relatives. To the
extent class members have any criminal
record—and many have no criminal history
whatsoever—it is often limited to minor
controlled substances offenses. Accordingly,
when class members do receive bond
hearings, they often produce glowing letters
of support from relatives, friends, employers,
and clergy attesting to their character and
contributions to their communities.
Prolonged detention imposes severe hardship
on class members and their families. Civil
immigration detainees are treated much like
criminals serving time: They are typically
housed in shared jail cells with no privacy
and limited access to larger spaces or the
outdoors. Confinement makes it more
difficult to retain or meet with legal counsel,
and the resources in detention facility law
libraries are minimal at best, thereby
compounding the challenges of navigating
the complexities of immigration law and
proceedings. In addition, visitation is
restricted and is often no-contact,
dramatically disrupting family relationships.
While in detention, class members have
missed their children's births and their
parents' funerals. After losing a vital source
of income, class members' spouses have
sought government assistance, and their
children have dropped out of college.
Lead petitioner Alejandro Rodriguez's story
is illustrative. Rodriguez came to the United

States as an infant and has lived here
continuously since then. Rodriguez is a
lawful permanent resident of the United
States, and his entire immediate family—
including his parents, siblings, and three
young children—also resides in the United
States as citizens or lawful permanent
residents. Before his removal proceedings
began, Rodriguez worked as a dental
assistant. In 2003, however, Rodriguez was
convicted of possession of a controlled
substance and sentenced to five years of
probation and no jail time. He had one
previous conviction, for “joyriding.”
In 2004, ICE commenced removal
proceedings and subjected Rodriguez to civil
detention. An IJ determined that Rodriguez's
prior conviction for “joyriding,” i.e. driving a
stolen vehicle, qualified as an “aggravated
felony” that rendered him ineligible for relief
in the form of cancellation of removal, and
therefore ordered him removed. Rodriguez
appealed the IJ's decision to the BIA, which
affirmed, and then to the Ninth Circuit. In
July 2005, a three-judge panel of our court
granted the government's motion to hold
Rodriguez's case in abeyance until the
Supreme Court decided a related case,
Gonzales v. Penuliar, which issued eighteen
months later, in January 2007. In Penuliar,
the Supreme Court vacated our court's
opinion and remanded for further
consideration in light of Gonzales v. Duenas–
Alvarez, which held that violating a
California statute prohibiting taking a vehicle
without the owner's consent qualifies as a
“theft offense.” Between July 2005 and
January 2007, while Rodriguez's case was in
abeyance, ICE conducted four custody
reviews on Rodriguez and repeatedly
determined that Rodriguez was required to
remain in detention until our court issued a
decision on the merits of his claim. In mid–
2007, about a month after Rodriguez had
moved for class certification, however, ICE
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released him. At that point, Rodriguez had
been detained for 1,189 days, roughly three
years and three months. In April 2008, in the
related case on remand from the Supreme
Court, our court held that driving a stolen
vehicle did not qualify as an aggravated
felony. On motion of the parties, we then
remanded Rodriguez's petition to the BIA,
which granted his application for cancellation
of removal, vindicating his right to lawfully
remain in the United States.

presume, like the district court, that IJs are
already doing so when determining whether
to release a non-citizen on bond.5 Because
the same constitutional concerns arise when
detention approaches another prolonged
period, we hold that IJs must provide bond
hearings periodically at six month intervals
for class members detained for more than
twelve months. However, we reject the
class's suggestion that we mandate additional
procedural requirements.

III. Standard of Review

A. Civil Detention

“We review a grant of summary
judgment de novo.” “A permanent
injunction ‘involves factual, legal,
and discretionary components,’ so we
‘review a decision to grant such relief
under several different standards.’”
“We review legal conclusions ... de
novo, factual findings for clear error,
and the scope of the injunction for
abuse of discretion.”
IV. Discussion
In resolving whether the district court erred
in entering the permanent injunction, we
consider, first, petitioners' entitlement to
bond hearings and, second, the procedural
requirements for such hearings. Based on our
precedents, we hold that the canon of
constitutional avoidance requires us to
construe the statutory scheme to provide all
class members who are in prolonged
detention with bond hearings at which the
government bears the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that the class
member is a danger to the community or a
flight risk. However, we also conclude that
individuals detained under § 1231(a) are not
members of the certified class. We affirm the
district court's order insofar as it requires
automatic bond hearings and requires IJs to
consider alternatives to detention because we

“In our society liberty is the norm, and
detention prior to trial or without trial is the
carefully limited exception.” Civil detention
violates the Due Process Clause except “in
certain special and narrow nonpunitive
circumstances, where a special justification,
such as harm-threatening mental illness,
outweighs the individual's constitutionally
protected interest in avoiding physical
restraint.” Consistent with these principles,
the Supreme Court has—outside of the
immigration context—found civil detention
constitutional without any individualized
showing of need only when faced with the
unique exigencies of global war or domestic
insurrection. And even in those extreme
circumstances, the Court's decisions have
been widely criticized. In all contexts apart
from immigration and military detention, the
Court has found that the Constitution requires
some individualized process and a judicial or
administrative finding that a legitimate
governmental interest justifies detention of
the person in question.
For example, in numerous cases addressing
the civil detention of mentally ill persons, the
Court has consistently recognized that such
commitment “constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty,” and so the state “must
have a constitutionally adequate purpose for
the confinement.” Further, the “nature and
duration of commitment” must “bear some
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reasonable relation to the purpose for which
the individual is committed.”
Accordingly, the state may detain a criminal
defendant found incapable of standing trial,
but only for “the reasonable period of time
necessary to determine whether there is a
substantial probability that he will attain [the]
capacity [to stand trial] in the foreseeable
future.” At all times, the individual's
“commitment must be justified by progress
toward that goal.” Likewise, the state may
detain a criminal defendant following an
acquittal by reason of insanity in order to
“treat the individual's mental illness and
protect him and society from his potential
dangerousness.” However, the detainee “is
entitled to release when he has recovered his
sanity or is no longer dangerous.” Further,
although the state may detain sexually
dangerous individuals even after they have
completed their criminal sentences, such
confinement must “take[ ] place pursuant to
proper
procedures
and
evidentiary
standards.” To “justify indefinite involuntary
commitment,” the state must prove both
“dangerousness” and “some additional
factor, such as a ‘mental illness' or ‘mental
abnormality.’ ”
Similarly, the Court has held that pretrial
detention of individuals charged with “the
most serious of crimes” is constitutional only
because, under the Bail Reform Act, an
“arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention
hearing” to determine whether his
confinement is necessary to prevent danger to
the community. Further, “the maximum
length of pretrial detention is limited by the
stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial
Act.”
In addition, the Court has held that
incarceration of individuals held in civil
contempt is consistent with due process only
where the contemnor receives adequate

procedural protections and the court makes
specific findings as to the individual's ability
to comply with the court order. If compliance
is impossible—for instance, if the individual
lacks the financial resources to pay courtordered child support—then contempt
sanctions do not serve their purpose of
coercing compliance and therefore violate the
Due Process Clause.
Early cases upholding immigration detention
policies were a product of their time. Yet
even these cases recognized some limits on
detention of non-citizens pending removal.
Such detention may not be punitive—
Congress may not, for example, impose
sentences of “imprisonment at hard labor” on
non-citizens awaiting deportation—and it
must be supported by a legitimate regulatory
purpose. Under these principles, the Court
authorized the “detention or temporary
confinement” of Chinese-born non-citizens
“pending the inquiry into their true character,
and while arrangements were being made for
their deportation.” The Court also upheld
executive detention of enemy aliens after the
cessation of active hostilities because
deportation is “hardly practicable” in the
midst of war, and enemy aliens' “potency for
mischief” continues “even when the guns are
silent.” Similarly, the Court approved
detention of communists to limit their
“opportunities to hurt the United States
during the pendency of deportation
proceedings.” The Court recognized,
however, that “purpose to injure could not be
imputed generally to all aliens subject to
deportation.” Rather, if the Attorney General
wished to exercise his discretion to deny bail,
he was required to do so at a hearing, the
results of which were subject to judicial
review.
More recently, the Supreme Court has drawn
on decades of civil detention jurisprudence to
hold that “[a] statute permitting indefinite
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detention of an alien would raise a serious
constitutional problem.” Although the state
has legitimate interests in “ensuring the
appearance of aliens at future immigration
proceedings”
and
“protecting
the
community,” post-removal period detention
does not uniformly “ ‘bear[ ] [a] reasonable
relation to the purpose for which the
individual [was] committed.’ ” To avoid
constitutional concerns, the Court construed
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), the statute governing
post—removal period detention, to “limit[ ]
an alien's post-removal-period detention to a
period reasonably necessary to bring about
that alien's removal from the United States.”
Detention beyond that point requires “strong
procedural protections” and a finding that the
non-citizen is “specially dangerous.”
Soon after Zadvydas, the Court rejected a due
process challenge to mandatory detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which applies to
non-citizens convicted of certain crimes.
While affirming its “longstanding view that
the Government may constitutionally detain
deportable aliens during the limited period
necessary for their removal proceedings,” the
Court emphasized that detention under §
1226(c) was constitutionally permissible
because it has “a definite termination point”
and typically “lasts for less than ... 90 days.”
Since Zadvydas and Demore, our court has
“grappled in piece-meal fashion with whether
the various immigration detention statutes
may authorize indefinite or prolonged
detention of detainees and, if so, may do so
without providing a bond hearing.” As we
recognized in Casas, “prolonged detention
without adequate procedural protections
would raise serious constitutional concerns.”
We have therefore held that non-citizens
detained pursuant to § 1226(a) and §
1231(a)(6) are entitled to bond hearings
before an IJ when detention becomes
prolonged.

While the government falsely equates the
bond hearing requirement to mandated
release from detention or facial invalidation
of a general detention statute, our precedents
make clear that there is a distinction
“between detention being authorized and
being necessary as to any particular person.”
Bond hearings do not restrict the
government's legitimate authority to detain
inadmissible or deportable non-citizens;
rather, they merely require the government to
“justify denial of bond” with clear and
convincing “evidence that an alien is a flight
risk or danger to the community.” And, in the
end, the government is required only to
establish that it has a legitimate interest
reasonably related to continued detention; the
discretion to release a non-citizen on bond or
other conditions remains soundly in the
judgment of the immigration judges the
Department of Justice employs.
Prior decisions have also clarified that
detention becomes “prolonged” at the sixmonth mark. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court
recognized six months as a “presumptively
reasonable period of detention.” By way of
background, the Court noted that in 1996,
Congress had “shorten[ed] the removal
period from six months to 90 days.” The
Court then explained:
While an argument can be made for confining
any presumption to 90 days, we doubt that
when Congress shortened the removal period
to 90 days in 1996 it believed that all
reasonably foreseeable removals could be
accomplished in that time. We do have
reason to believe, however, that Congress
previously doubted the constitutionality of
detention for more than six months.
Consequently, for the sake of uniform
administration in the federal courts, we
recognize that period.
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Following Zadvydas, we have defined
detention as “prolonged” when “it has lasted
six months and is expected to continue more
than minimally beyond six months.” At that
point, we have explained, “the private
interests at stake are profound,” and “the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of liberty in the
absence of a hearing before a neutral
decisionmaker is substantial.”
B. Entitlement to a Bond Hearing
With this well-established precedent of the
Supreme Court and our Court in mind, we
review the district court's grant of summary
judgment and entry of a permanent
injunction. We consider, in turn, whether
individuals detained under §§ 1226(c),
1225(b), 1226(a), and 1231(a) are entitled to
bond hearings after they have been detained
for six months.
1. The § 1226(c) Subclass
Section 1226(c) requires that the Attorney
General detain any non-citizen who is
inadmissible or deportable because of his
criminal history upon that person's release
from imprisonment, pending proceedings to
remove him from the United States.
Detention under § 1226(c) is mandatory.
Individuals detained under that section are
not eligible for release on bond or parole;
they may be released only if the Attorney
General deems it “necessary” for witness
protection purposes, id. § 1226(c)(2).
An individual detained under § 1226(c) may
ask an IJ to reconsider whether the mandatory
detention provision applies to him, but such
review is limited in scope and addresses only
whether the individual is properly included in
a category of non-citizens subject to
mandatory detention based on his criminal
history. At a “Joseph hearing,” a detainee
“may avoid mandatory detention by

demonstrating that he is not an alien, was not
convicted of the predicate crime, or that the
[DHS] is otherwise substantially unlikely to
establish that he is in fact subject to
mandatory detention.” “A determination in
favor of an alien” at a Joseph hearing “does
not lead to automatic release,” because the
government retains discretionary authority to
detain the individual under § 1226(a).
Instead, such a determination allows the IJ to
consider granting bond under the § 1226(a)
standards, namely, whether the detainee
would pose a danger or flight risk if released.
As a result of § 1226(c)'s mandatory language
and the limited review available through a
Joseph hearing, individuals are often
detained for years without adequate process.
Members of the § 1226(c) subclass also tend
to be detained for longer periods than other
class members: The longest-detained class
member was confined for 1,585 days and
counting as of April 28, 2012, and the
average subclass member faces detention for
427 days. These lengthy detention times bear
no relationship to the seriousness of class
members' criminal history or the lengths of
their previously served criminal sentences. In
several instances identified by class counsel,
a class member was sentenced to one to three
months in prison for a minor controlled
substances offense, then endured one or two
years in immigration detention. Nor do these
detention durations bear any relation to the
merits of the subclass members' claims: Of
the § 1226(c) subclass members who apply
for relief from removal, roughly 40% are
granted such relief, a rate even higher than
that of the overall class.
In Rodriguez II, we held that “the prolonged
detention of an alien [under § 1226(c)]
without an individualized determination of
his dangerousness or flight risk would be
constitutionally doubtful.” To avoid these
“constitutional concerns, § 1226(c)'s
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mandatory language must be construed ‘to
contain an implicit reasonable time
limitation.’ ” Accordingly, at the six-month
mark, “when detention becomes prolonged, §
1226(c) becomes inapplicable,” and “the
Attorney General's detention authority rests
with § 1226(a).” Under Casas, those
detainees are then entitled to a bond hearing.
Contrary to the government's argument, this
holding is consistent with the text of §
1226(c), which requires that the government
detain certain non-citizens but does not
mandate such detention for any particular
length of time. Our holding is also consistent
with the Supreme Court's decision in
Demore, which turned on the brevity of the
detention at issue.
Since Rodriguez II, no intervening changes in
the law have affected our conclusions.
Neither the Supreme Court nor our Circuit
has had occasion to reexamine these issues,
and the Third and Sixth Circuits have not
changed the positions they adopted in Diop
and Ly, respectively.
Moreover, district courts have relied on
Rodriguez II in resolving numerous habeas
petitions filed by immigration detainees.
Thus, Rodriguez II is law of the case and law
of the circuit. As we recently explained, the
“law of the case doctrine” provides that “a
court will generally refuse to reconsider an
issue that has already been decided by the
same court or a higher court in the same
case.” Likewise, pursuant to the “‘law of the
circuit’ rule,” “a published decision of this
court constitutes binding authority which
‘must be followed unless and until overruled
by a body competent to do so.’ ”
The “‘general rule’ is that our decisions ‘at
the preliminary injunction phase do not
constitute the law of the case.’ ” Because

preliminary injunction decisions are often
“made hastily and on less than a full record,”
they “may provide little guidance as to the
appropriate disposition on the merits.”
However, “there is an exception to the
general rule for ‘conclusions on pure issues
of law.’ ”
The question resolved in Rodriguez II—
whether non-citizens subject to prolonged
detention under § 1226(c) are entitled to bond
hearings—is a pure question of law. We
interpreted the statute by applying the canon
of constitutional avoidance, and were bound
to do so by our prior precedent. The decision
was not made “hastily”; it provided a “fully
considered appellate ruling” on the legal
issues.
2. The § 1225(b) Subclass
Section 1225(b) applies to “applicants for
admission” who are stopped at the border or
a port of entry, or who are “present in the
United States” but “ha[ve] not been
admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). The statute
provides that asylum seekers “shall be
detained pending a final determination of
credible fear of persecution and, if found not
to have such a fear, until removed.” As to all
other applicants for admission, the statute
provides that “if the examining immigration
officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be
detained” for removal proceedings.
Under DHS regulations, non-citizens
detained pursuant to § 1225(b) are generally
not eligible for release on bond. If there are
“urgent humanitarian reasons or significant
public benefit[s]” at stake, however, the
Attorney General has discretion to
temporarily parole such an individual into the
United States, provided that the individual
presents neither a danger nor a risk of flight.
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Because parole decisions under § 1182 are
purely discretionary, they cannot be appealed
to IJs or courts. This lack of review has
proven especially problematic when
immigration officers have denied parole
based on blatant errors: In two separate cases
identified by the petitioners, for example,
officers apparently denied parole because
they had confused Ethiopia with Somalia.
And in a third case, an officer denied parole
because he had mixed up two detainees' files.
As with § 1226(c), the government often cites
§ 1225(b)'s mandatory language to justify
indefinite civil detention without an
individualized determination as to whether
the detainee would pose a danger or flight
risk if released. Section 1225(b) subclass
members have been detained for as long as
831 days, and for an average of 346 days
each. These individuals apply for and receive
relief from removal at very high rates: 94%
apply, and of those who apply, 64% are
granted relief. In illustrative cases identified
by the petitioners, non-citizens fled to the
United States after surviving kidnapping,
torture, and murder of their family members
in their home countries. Upon arrival, these
individuals were detained under § 1225(b),
and they remained in detention until the
government
granted
their
asylum
applications hundreds of days later.
In Rodriguez II, we extended Casas and held
that to avoid serious constitutional concerns,
mandatory detention under § 1225(b), like
mandatory detention under § 1226(c), must
be construed as implicitly time-limited.
Accordingly, “the mandatory provisions of §
1225(b) simply expire at six months, at which
point the government's authority to detain the
alien shifts to § 1226(a), which is
discretionary and which we have already held
requires a bond hearing.”
In so holding, we recognized that many
members of the § 1225(b) subclass are

subject to the “entry fiction” doctrine, under
which non-citizens seeking admission to the
United States “may physically be allowed
within its borders pending a determination of
admissibility,” but “are legally considered to
be detained at the border and hence as never
having effected entry into this country.” Such
non-citizens therefore “enjoy very limited
protections under the United States
constitution.” However, even if the majority
of prolonged detentions under § 1225(b) are
constitutionally permissible, “the Supreme
Court has instructed that, where one possible
application of a statute raises constitutional
concerns, the statute as a whole should be
construed through the prism of constitutional
avoidance.” Section 1225(b) applies to
several categories of lawful permanent
residents who are not subject to the entry
fiction doctrine but may be treated as seeking
admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C).
Because those persons are entitled to due
process protections under the Fifth
Amendment, prolonged detention without
bond hearings would raise serious
constitutional concerns. We therefore
construed the statutory scheme to require a
bond hearing after six months of detention
under § 1225(b).
The government now argues that “[d]espite
years of discovery, petitioners have not
identified any member of the Section 1225(b)
subclass who is a [lawful permanent
resident].” Petitioners represent that they
have found lawful permanent residents who
have been detained for more than six months
under § 1225(b), although their submissions
do not identify any specific individuals who
fit that description. The question, however, is
whether “one possible application of [the]
statute raises constitutional concerns.”
Because the government concedes that
detention of lawful permanent residents
under § 1225(b) is possible under §
1101(a)(13)(C), “the statute as a whole
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should be construed through the prism of
constitutional avoidance.”
The government also argues that lawful
permanent residents treated as seeking
admission are entitled to lesser due process
protections than other lawful permanent
residents. But the government has not
provided any authority to support that
proposition: The cases cited in the
government's brief address statutory and
regulatory distinctions between lawful
permanent residents treated as applicants for
admission and other lawful permanent
residents; they do not reflect any
constitutional distinction between those
groups.
Finally, the government argues that, instead
of requiring bond hearings, we could avoid
constitutional concerns by interpreting §
1225(b) not to apply to lawful permanent
residents. This argument relies on an
implausible construction of the statutes at
issue. Section 1225(b) applies to “applicants
for admission,” and § 1101 defines six
categories of lawful permanent residents as
“seeking an admission into the United States
for purposes of the immigration laws.”
The Supreme Court's decision in Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding is not to the contrary. Chew
involved a pre-IIRIRA immigration
regulation that applied to “excludable” noncitizens. Because the regulations were silent
as to whether that category included lawful
permanent residents returning from voyages
abroad, the Court distinguished between the
“exclusion” of newly arriving non-citizens
and the “expulsion” of lawful permanent
residents, thereby holding that the regulation
did not authorize the Attorney General to
detain arriving lawful permanent residents
without hearings. Section 1101(a)(13)(C)
forecloses an analogous construction of §
1225(b) because it provides that “applicants

for admission” includes several groups of
lawful permanent residents. In any event, the
government's alternative construction of §
1225(b) was never raised before the district
court; the argument is therefore forfeited.
Accordingly, we adhere to Rodriguez II's
holding regarding the § 1225(b) subclass as
law of the case and law of the circuit. The
government's
attempts
to
re-litigate
Rodriguez II are unavailing.
3. The § 1226(a) Subclass
Section 1226(a) authorizes detention
“pending a decision on whether the alien is to
be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a). The statute expressly authorizes
release on “bond of at least $1,500” or
“conditional parole.” Following an initial
custody determination by DHS, a non-citizen
may apply for a review or redetermination by
an IJ, and that decision may be appealed to
the BIA. At these hearings, the detainee bears
the burden of establishing “that he or she does
not present a danger to persons or property, is
not a threat to the national security, and does
not pose a risk of flight.” “After an initial
bond redetermination,” a request for another
review “shall be considered only upon a
showing that the alien's circumstances have
changed materially since the prior bond
redetermination.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). The
government has taken the position that
additional time spent in detention is not a
“changed circumstance” that entitles a
detainee to a new bond hearing.
Although § 1226(a) provides for
discretionary, rather than mandatory,
detention and establishes a mechanism for
detainees to seek release on bond, noncitizens often face prolonged detention under
that section. In an extreme case identified by
the petitioners, a non-citizen with no criminal
record entered the United States on a tourist
visa and affirmatively applied for asylum,
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withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture shortly after that
visa expired. ICE detained him throughout
the ensuing proceedings before the IJ, the
BIA, and the Ninth Circuit. At the time
petitioners generated their report, he had been
detained for 1,234 days with no definite end
in sight.

4. The § 1231(a) Subclass

The district court's decision regarding the §
1226(a) subclass was squarely controlled by
our precedents. In Casas, we held that a noncitizen subjected to prolonged detention
under § 1226(a) is entitled to a hearing to
establish whether continued detention is
necessary because he would pose a danger to
the community or a flight risk upon release.
Since deciding Casas, we have repeatedly
affirmed its holding.

The removal period begins on the latest of the
following:

The government does not contest that Casas
is the binding law of this circuit or that
individuals detained under § 1226(a) are
entitled to bond hearings. Instead, the
government argues that § 1226(a) affords
detainees the right to request bond hearings,
so there is no basis for requiring the
government to automatically provide bond
hearings after six months of detention. This
argument is foreclosed by Casas, which held
that “§ 1226(c) must be construed as
requiring the Attorney General to provide the
alien with [a bond] hearing.” The record
evinces the importance of Casas's holding on
this point: Detainees, who typically have no
choice but to proceed pro se, have limited
access to legal resources, often lack Englishlanguage proficiency, and are sometimes
illiterate. As a result, many class members are
not aware of their right to a bond hearing and
are poorly equipped to request one.
Accordingly, we conclude that class
members are entitled to automatic bond
hearings after six months of detention. We
address the other procedural requirements for
these hearings in Section IV.B, infra.

Section 1231(a) governs detention of noncitizens who have been “ordered removed.” 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a). The statute provides for
mandatory detention during a ninety-day
removal period. Id. § 1231(a)(2). Under the
statute:

(i)

The date the order of removal
becomes administratively final.

(ii)

If the removal order is judicially
reviewed and if a court orders a
stay of the removal of the alien,
the date of the court's final order.

(iii)

If the alien is detained or confined
(except under an immigration
process), the date the alien is
released from detention or
confinement.

The removal period may be extended beyond
ninety days if a detainee “fails or refuses” to
cooperate in his removal from the United
States.
“If the alien does not leave or is not removed
within the removal period,” he “shall be
subject to supervision,” but detention is no
longer mandatory. Rather, the Attorney
General has discretion to detain certain
classes of non-citizens and to impose
conditions of release on others. Before
releasing a detainee, the government must
conclude that removal is “not practicable or
not in the public interest,” that the detainee is
“non-violent” and “not likely to pose a threat
to the community following release,” and that
the detainee “does not pose a significant
flight risk” and is “not likely to violate the
conditions of release.”
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Here, the class is defined, in relevant part, as
non-citizens who are detained “pending
completion of removal proceedings,
including judicial review.” The class
therefore by definition excludes any detainee
subject to a final order of removal.
Petitioners describe the § 1231(a) subclass as
individuals detained under that section who
have received a stay of removal from the BIA
or a court. However, if a non-citizen has
received a stay of removal from the BIA
pending further administrative review, then
the order of removal is not yet
“administratively final.” The non-citizen has
not been “ordered removed,” and the removal
period has not begun, so § 1231(a) is
inapplicable. Similarly, as long as a noncitizen's removal order is stayed by a court
pending judicial review, that non-citizen is
not subject to “the court's final order.” In such
circumstances, § 1231(a) is, again,
inapplicable.
Simply put, the § 1231(a) subclass does not
exist. The district court's grant of summary
judgment and permanent injunction are
therefore reversed to the extent they pertain
to individuals detained under § 1231(a).
C. Procedural Requirements
In addition to challenging the class members'
entitlement to automatic bond hearings after
six months of detention, the government
objects to the district court's order regarding
the burden and standard of proof at such
hearings. The government also appeals the
district court's ruling that IJs must consider
alternatives to detention. Petitioners crossappeal the district court's rulings that IJs are
not required to consider the ultimate
likelihood of removal, assess the total length
of detention, or conduct periodic hearings at
six-month intervals. We address each issue in
turn.

1. Burden and Standard of Proof
The government argues that the district court
erred in requiring the government to justify a
non-citizen's detention by clear and
convincing evidence, an intermediate burden
of proof that is more than a preponderance of
the evidence but less than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. As we noted in Rodriguez
II, however, we are bound by our precedent
in Singh, which held that “the government
must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the
community to justify denial of bond at a
Casas hearing.”
In Singh, we explained that the “Supreme
Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle
that ‘due process places a heightened burden
of proof on the State in civil proceedings in
which the individual interests at stake ... are
both particularly important and more
substantial than mere loss of money.’ ” In the
civil commitment context, for example, the
Supreme Court has recognized “the state's
interest in committing the emotionally
disturbed,” but has held that “the individual's
interest in not being involuntarily confined
indefinitely ... is of such weight and gravity
that due process requires the state to justify
confinement by proof more substantial than a
mere preponderance of the evidence.”
Drawing on this jurisprudence, Singh
concluded that “a clear and convincing
evidence standard of proof provides the
appropriate level of procedural protection” in
light of “the substantial liberty interest at
stake.”
The government now contends that Singh
was wrongly decided. However, it is well
established that only a full court, sitting en
banc, may overrule a three-judge panel
decision. Right or wrong, we are bound to
follow Singh unless intervening Supreme
Court authority is to the contrary.
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2. Restrictions Short of Detention
The government also argues that the district
court erred in “determin [ing] that IJs are
required to consider the use of alternatives to
detention in making bond determinations.”
As the district court's order states, however,
IJs “should already be considering
restrictions short of incarceration.” Indeed,
Rodriguez II affirmed a preliminary
injunction that directed IJs to “release each
Subclass member on reasonable conditions of
supervision, including electronic monitoring
if necessary, unless the government” satisfied
its burden of justifying continued detention.
The government's objections to this
requirement are unpersuasive. First, the
government relies on Demore for the
proposition that the government is not
required “to employ the least burdensome
means” of securing immigration detainees.
But Demore applies only to “brief period[s]”
of immigration detention. “When the period
of detention becomes prolonged, ‘the private
interest that will be affected by the official
action’ is more substantial; greater
procedural
safeguards
are
therefore
required.” Further, the injunction does not
require that IJs apply the least restrictive
means of supervision; it merely directs them
to “consider” restrictions short of detention.
The IJ ultimately must decide whether any
restrictions short of detention would further
the government's interest in continued
detention.
Second, the government argues that IJs are
not empowered to impose conditions of
release. However, federal regulations
authorize IJs to “detain the alien in custody,
release the alien, and determine the amount
of bond, if any, under which the respondent
may be released” and to “ameliorat[e] the
conditions” of release imposed by DHS.
Accordingly, if DHS detains a non-citizen, an

IJ is already empowered to “ameliorat[e] the
conditions” by imposing a less restrictive
means of supervision than detention.
Finally, the government argues that IJs lack
the resources to engage in continuous
monitoring of released individuals. However,
the government fails to cite any law or
evidence indicating that IJs, rather than DHS
or ICE agents, would be responsible for
implementing the conditions of release.
Moreover, the record indicates that Congress
authorized and funded an ICE alternatives-todetention program in 2002, and DHS has
operated such a program, called the Intensive
Supervision and Appearance Program, since
2004. It is abundantly clear that IJs can and
do17 consider conditions of release on bond
when determining whether the government's
interests can be served by detention only, and
we conclude that DHS will administer any
such conditions, regardless of whether they
are imposed by DHS in the first instance or
by an IJ upon later review.
3. Length of Detention and Likelihood of
Removal
In their cross-appeal, petitioners argue that
the district court erred in failing to require IJs
to consider the length of a non-citizen's past
and likely future detention and, relatedly, the
likelihood of eventual removal from the
United States. In our prior decisions, we have
not directly addressed whether due process
requires consideration of the length of future
detention at bond hearings. We have noted,
however, that “the due process analysis
changes as ‘the period of ... confinement
grows,’ ” and that longer detention requires
more robust procedural protections.
Accordingly, a non-citizen detained for one
or more years is entitled to greater solicitude
than a non-citizen detained for six months.
Moreover, Supreme Court precedent
provides that “detention incidental to
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removal must bear a reasonable relation to its
purpose.” At some point, the length of
detention could “become[ ] so egregious that
it can no longer be said to be ‘reasonably
related’ to an alien's removal.” An IJ
therefore must consider the length of time for
which a non-citizen has already been
detained.
As to the likely duration of future detention
and the likelihood of eventual removal,
however, those factors are too speculative
and too dependent upon the merits of the
detainee's claims for us to require IJs to
consider during a bond hearing. We therefore
affirm the district court's ruling that
consideration of those factors “would require
legal and political analyses beyond what
would otherwise be considered at a bond
hearing” and is therefore not appropriate. We
note that Zadvydas and its progeny require
consideration of the likelihood of removal in
particular circumstances,18 but we decline to
require such analysis as a threshold inquiry in
all bond hearings.
4. Periodic Hearings
The record shows that many class members
are detained well beyond the six-month
mark: Almost half remain in detention at the
twelve-month mark, one in five at eighteen
months, and one in ten at twenty-four
months. Petitioners argue that due process
requires additional bond hearings at sixmonth intervals for class members who are
detained for more than six months after their
initial bond hearings. We have not had
occasion to address this issue in our previous
decisions, and it has been a source of some
contention in the district courts.
The district court here did not address this
proposed requirement. For the same reasons
the IJ must consider the length of past
detention, we hold that the government must

provide periodic bond hearings every six
months so that noncitizens may challenge
their continued detention as “the period of ...
confinement grows.”
V. Conclusion
This decision flows from the Supreme
Court's and our own precedent bearing on the
constitutional
implications
of
our
government's prolonged civil detention of
individuals, many of whom have the legal
right to live and work in our country. By
upholding the district court's order that
Immigration Judges must hold bond hearings
for certain detained individuals, we are not
ordering Immigration Judges to release any
single individual; rather we are affirming a
minimal procedural safeguard—a hearing at
which the government bears only an
intermediate
burden
of
proof
in
demonstrating danger to the community or
risk of flight—to ensure that after a lengthy
period of detention, the government
continues to have a legitimate interest in the
further deprivation of an individual's liberty.
Immigration Judges, a specialized and
experienced group within the Department of
Justice, are already entrusted to make these
determinations, and need not release any
individual they find presents a danger to the
community or a flight risk after hearing and
weighing the evidence. Accordingly, we
affirm all aspects of the district court's
permanent injunction, with three exceptions:
We reverse as to the § 1231(a) subclass, and
we hold that IJs must consider the length of
detention and provide bond hearings every
six months. We hereby remand to the district
court to enter a revised injunction consistent
with our instructions.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN
PART; REMANDED.

335

“Supreme Court to Review No-Bail Policy for Immigrants Awaiting
Hearings”
The Wall Street Journal
Jess Bravin
June 20, 2016

The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to
hear a Justice Department appeal of a 2015
lower-court decision requiring bail hearings
for immigrants who have been in detention
for at least six months awaiting deportation
proceedings.
However, the American Civil Liberties
Union—which won a lower-court ruling
requiring bail hearings after six months—
said recently disclosed hearing records show
a 2003 high-court precedent the Justice
Department cited to bolster its case was
partly based on government-supplied
information that understated the length of
immigration detentions.
It isn’t clear whether a difference in the time
frame would have affected the outcome of the
2003 case. But critics of the government’s
immigration policies say that prehearing
detention with no chance for bail becomes
less reasonable the longer it lasts.
The 2003 case, Demore v. Kim, upheld by a
5-4 vote the government’s practice of holding
without bail immigrants—even those who are
permanent U.S. residents with “green
cards”—who became eligible for deportation
because they committed a crime.

The majority opinion in that case stressed the
“very limited” length of no-bail detentions at
issue, relying on figures showing the average
detention in 2001 was 47 days, while the 15%
of immigrants who appeal a deportation order
were in detention for about 4½ months. The
figures were provided by the Executive
Office for Immigration Review, which
conducts the hearings.
The ACLU, which worked on the 2003 case,
said the actual average detention time in 2001
was 2½ half weeks longer. “The real number
is 65 days,” said Michael Tan, an ACLU
attorney. The group learned of issues with
statistics in the earlier case through a
Freedom of Information Act request filed
during the current litigation.
Mr. Tan said the government reached the
lower number by factoring in categories of
aliens that an immigration judge was required
to deport—cases that are resolved quickly
because there are no issues for the hearing to
resolve. Mr. Tan also said the government
counted as completed cases that weren’t over
but only transferred—with the immigrant still
in detention—to another immigration court.
Justice Department spokesman Patrick
Rodenbush said officials were re-examining
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the numbers provided in the Kim case, but
after an initial review, “we feel our
information to the court was appropriate.”

Justice Department provided incorrect
information to the Supreme Court regarding
immigration practices.

A 2012 Justice Department inspector general
report criticized the Executive Office for
Immigration Review for reporting its
performance in ways that are “incomplete
and overstate the actual accomplishments” of
its courts.

In 2012, the department told the court it had
incorrectly stated in 2009 that it “facilitated”
the return to the U.S. of deported aliens who
later win their immigration appeals. The
government then altered its practice to
conform to what it told the court it already
had been doing, government and immigration
lawyers say.

Theodore Olson, who as solicitor general
argued the government’s position in 2003,
said he had little recollection of the case and
didn’t remember any internal dispute over the
length of detentions.“Statistics like that
would presumably have come from the
agency or agencies responsible,” Mr. Olson
said. It would be “highly unlikely” for
lawyers in his office to delve “into such
statistics at a granular level.”
David Strauss, a law professor at the
University of Chicago, said the possibility of
error in a solicitor general brief was troubling
because unlike other litigants, the office often
introduces new information at the Supreme
Court level.
“What the (solicitor general) says in its brief
is not subject to the usual testing the legal
system provides for its claims,” Mr. Strauss
said. “The court is really counting on them to
get it right because there’s no other check.”

Last year, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in San Francisco held the
Constitution’s
due-process
guarantee
requires a bail hearing where detained
immigrants can argue they will show up later
for their date in immigration court and pose
no risk to public safety. The Obama
administration appealed that decision to the
Supreme Court.
In deciding the class-action suit, the Ninth
Circuit relied on both the Kim precedent and
an earlier case holding that immigrants
detained indefinitely are entitled to a bail
hearing after six months. The appeals court
observed that affected immigrants “spend, on
average, 404 days in immigration detention,”
which is considered an administrative matter
rather than a form of punishment.

The court will hear the case on bail hearings
in its next term, which begins in October.
The Kim case marks the second time in recent
years that a records disclosure suggested the
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“High Court To Decide If Immigrants Entitled To Bond Hearings”
Law360
Allissa Wickham
June 20, 2016

The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday decided
to hear a case over whether certain
immigrants are entitled to automatic bond
hearings following six months of detention,
adding another layer to the national debate
over immigrant detention.
The high court granted certiorari to Jennings
v. Rodriguez, in which the Ninth Circuit
ruled, among other things, that immigrants
are entitled to bond hearings after six months
if they were detained under a provision
allowing the government to hold immigrants
during their deportation proceedings. As is
customary, the justices did not explain their
reasoning for taking up the case.
In its March 25 petition, the U.S. Department
of Justice had strongly urged the justices to
review the October ruling from the Ninth
Circuit. The agency claimed the appeals
court’s “wholesale revision” of the law on the
detention of immigrants during deportation
proceedings “oversteps the proper judicial
role.”
The government also argued that the court’s
decision gets in the way of the Department of
Homeland Security’s ability to control U.S.
borders.
But Alejandro Rodriguez, a green card holder
representing a class of noncitizens

challenging their detention, had asked the
justices not to hear the appeal.
“The government’s contention that certiorari
is warranted to preserve its ability to control
the borders and reduce the risk of terrorism is
hyperbolic and unsupported by anything in
the decision below or the voluminous record
compiled in the district court,” Rodriguez had
argued.
If the high court were to affirm the Ninth
Circuit, the impact of such a ruling could be
significant, according to Denise Gilman, the
director of the immigration clinic at the
University of Texas School of Law. Such a
decision would mean "whole swaths of the
country" would be in a situation where people
held under mandatory detention provisions
would have a right to detention review, she
previously told Law360.
However, if the justices upheld the Ninth
Circuit,
the
already
overburdened
immigration courts across the country could
find themselves overwhelmed with having to
set new hearings, according to Holly Cooper,
the associate director of the immigration law
clinic at University of California Davis
School of Law, who submitted an amicus
brief in the Rodriguez appeal.
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"It would be enormous if every circuit
adopted this ruling," Cooper said, noting that
"immigration courts would probably almost
buckle with the overwhelming need to set
new hearings."
The issue of immigrant detention has also
popped up in other courts, such as the Second
Circuit. The appeals court held in October
that the government cannot indefinitely
detain immigrants awaiting deportation
proceedings following criminal offenses,
saying they must be given a bail hearing
within six months of being taken into
custody.

The federal petitioners are represented by
Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr.
The respondents have been represented in the
case by Alan Thevanesan Arulanantham of
the ACU oundation of Southern California,
Sean Ashley Commons of Sidley Austin LLP
and others.
The case is David Jennings v. Alejandro
Rodriguez, case number 15-1204, in the U.S.
Supreme Court.

And in another case, the federal government
is asking the Ninth Circuit to overturn a
ruling that found the Obama administration’s
detention of immigrant families violated a
1997 agreement that set national standards
for dealing with undocumented children.
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“Courts Say Detained Non-Citizens Have The Right To Bond Hearings”
NPR
Richard Gonzales
October 29, 2015

At the same time that immigration is a hotbutton issue on the presidential campaign
trail, in the courts, immigration advocates are
chipping away at the government's authority
to detain non-citizens indefinitely.

"Every circuit [appeals] court has ruled that it
is unlawful to hold a detainee without that
person having the possibility of a hearing,"
said Ahilan Arulanantham, deputy legal
director of the ACLU of Southern California.

Two rulings issued this week from the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New
York and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in California say that detainees have the right
to a bond hearing while they are fighting their
deportation cases.

The Ninth Circuit, in Rodriguez v. Robbins,
ruled that the government has to justify "by
clear and convincing evidence that an alien is
a flight risk or a danger to the community to
justify denial of bond." It also ruled the
government has to consider alternatives to
detention such as electronic monitoring
devices. Finally, it said detainees should get
a bond hearing every six months.

The practical impact? Thousands of
immigrants, legal or not, who were held for
indefinite periods now have the right to a
release hearing where it will be up to an
immigration judge to decide whether they are
dangerous or present a flight risk. The courts'
rulings apply in the states covered by those
circuits.
Ever since 1996, when Congress passed the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act, the government has
detained broad categories of non-citizens for
prolonged periods and denied them the right
to challenge their detention.
The constitutionality of that section of the
law was first challenged in 2003. Since then,
there's been a flurry of court rulings.

"This decision substantially decreases the
likelihood people will get lost in the system
for years on end because there will be some
examination of why the person is still locked
away. It provides them with an elemental
component of due
process," said
Arulanantham.
In a more limited ruling, the Second Circuit
in New York, in a case called Lora v.
Shanahan adopted what it called "a brightline rule" that detainees must get a hearing
within six months of his or her detention.
Two other appellate courts, the Third and the
Sixth Circuits, have ruled that a detainee
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must file a habeas petition or a lawsuit before
getting a hearing.
With respect to the Ninth Circuit ruling, a
spokesman for U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement said his agency "is
aware of the judges' order and reviewing it."
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Lynch v. Morales-Santana
15-1191
Ruling Below: Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2015)
Luis Morales was born the child of an unwed couple. His father was a US citizen, while his
mother was not. Morales attempted to establish himself as a citizen under the doctrine of
derivative citizenship. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied his motion to reevaluate his
claim. Morales appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that the grant of citizenship was permissible, and that the gender
discrepancy placed on the physical presence requirement of derivative citizenship violated equal
protection
Question Presented: Whether Congress’s decision to impose a different physical-presence
requirement on unwed citizen mothers of foreign-born children than on other citizen parents of
foreign-born children through 8 U.S.C. 1401 and 1409 (1958) violates the Fifth Amendment’s
guarantee of equal protection; and whether the court of appeals erred in conferring U.S.
citizenship on respondent, in the absence of any express statutory authority to do so.

Luis Ramon MORALES–SANTANA, aka Luis Morales, Petitioner,
v.
Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney GENERAL, Respondent.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Decided on July 8, 2015, Amended on October 30, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
LOHIER, Circuit Judge:
Luis Ramon Morales–Santana asks us to
review a March 3, 2011 decision of the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his
motion to reopen his removal proceedings
relating to his claim of derivative citizenship.
Under the statute in effect when Morales–
Santana was born—the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (the “1952 Act”)—a
child born abroad to an unwed citizen mother
and non-citizen father has citizenship at birth
so long as the mother was present in the

United States or one of its outlying
possessions for a continuous period of at least
one year at some point prior to the child's
birth. By contrast, a child born abroad to an
unwed citizen father and non-citizen mother
has citizenship at birth only if the father was
present in the United States or one of its
outlying possessions prior to the child's birth
for a period or periods totaling at least ten
years, with at least five of those years
occurring after the age of fourteen. Morales–
Santana's father satisfied the requirements for
transmitting citizenship applicable to unwed
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mothers but not the more stringent
requirements applicable to unwed fathers. On
appeal, Morales–Santana argues principally
that this gender-based difference violates the
Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection and that the proper remedy is to
extend to unwed fathers the benefits unwed
mothers receive under § 1409(c). We agree
and hold that Morales–Santana derived
citizenship at birth through his father. We
accordingly REVERSE the BIA's decision
and REMAND for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

derivative citizenship as of his or her birth.
Accordingly, the 1952 Act provides the
statutory framework applicable to Morales–
Santana's nationality claim.

BACKGROUND

As noted, the 1952 Act limits the ability of an
unwed citizen father to confer citizenship on
his child born abroad—where the child's
mother is not a citizen at the time of the
child's birth—more stringently than it limits
the ability of a similarly situated unwed
citizen mother to do the same. We note that
this difference in treatment of unwed citizen
fathers and unwed citizen mothers, though
diminished, persists in the current statute.

I. Facts

III. Procedural History

The following undisputed facts are drawn
from the record on appeal. Morales–
Santana's father, Jose Dolores Morales, was
born in Puerto Rico on March 19, 1900 and
acquired United States citizenship in 1917
pursuant to the Jones Act. He was physically
present in Puerto Rico until February 27,
1919, 20 days before his nineteenth birthday,
when he left Puerto Rico to work in the
Dominican Republic for the South Porto Rico
Sugar Company.

In 2000 Morales–Santana was placed in
removal proceedings after having been
convicted of various felonies. He applied for
withholding of removal on the basis of
derivative citizenship obtained through his
father. An immigration judge denied the
application. In 2010 Morales–Santana *525
filed a motion to reopen based on a violation
of equal protection and newly obtained
evidence relating to his father. The BIA
rejected Morales–Santana's arguments for
derivative citizenship and denied his motion
to reopen.

In 1962 Morales–Santana was born in the
Dominican Republic to his father and his
Dominican mother. Morales–Santana was
what
is
statutorily
described
as
“legitimat[ed]” by his father upon his parents'
marriage in 1970 and admitted to the United
States as a lawful permanent resident in 1975.
8 U.S.C. § 1409(a). Morales–Santana's father
died in 1976.
II. Statutory Framework
Unlike citizenship by naturalization,
derivative citizenship exists as of a child's
birth or not at all. The law in effect at the time
of birth governs whether a child obtained

DISCUSSION
Morales–Santana makes four arguments for
derivative citizenship: (1) that his father's
physical absence from the United States
during the 20 days directly prior to his
father's nineteenth birthday constituted a de
minimis “gap” in physical presence, and that
such gaps should not count against a finding
of physical presence for purposes of §
1401(a)(7); (2) that the South Porto Rico
Sugar Company, which employed his father
after his father moved to the Dominican
Republic, was a multi-national United States343

owned company and therefore effectively
part of the United States government or an
international organization as defined in 22
U.S.C. § 288; (3) that at the time his father
moved to the Dominican Republic it was an
“outlying possession” of the United States;
and (4) as noted, that the different physical
presence requirements applicable to unwed
fathers and unwed mothers under the 1952
Act violate equal protection.
Consistent with our obligation to avoid
constitutional questions if possible, we first
address Morales–Santana's three statutory
arguments for derivative citizenship.
As to both his statutory and constitutional
arguments, we review de novo the question
of Morales–Santana's derivative citizenship.
“If the petitioner claims to be a national of the
United States and the court of appeals finds
from the pleadings and affidavits that no
genuine issue of material fact about the
petitioner's nationality is presented, the court
shall decide the nationality claim.” No
material facts are disputed.
I. Statutory Arguments
Morales–Santana contends that his father's
absence from the United States during the 20
days prior to his father's nineteenth birthday
constitutes a de minimis “gap” in his father's
physical presence and that such gaps should
not be held against someone who claims to
have satisfied the 1952 Act's physical
presence requirement. In support, Morales–
Santana points to continuous physical
presence requirements under the immigration
laws that explicitly excuse de minimis
absences. By its plain terms, § 1401(a)(7) had
no similar exception. In any event, because
Morales–Santana's father left the United
States and its outlying possessions 20 days
prior to his nineteenth birthday and never
returned, there was no “gap” in his father's

physical presence that bridged two periods of
physical presence. So even if we recognized
an exception to the physical presence
requirement in § 1401 for de minimis “gaps,”
we would reject Morales–Santana's claim on
this basis.
Relying on the 1966 Act, Morales–Santana
next argues that his father's employment with
the South Porto Rico Sugar Company in the
Dominican Republic immediately after
leaving Puerto Rico satisfied the statute's
physical presence requirement by effectively
continuing his physical presence through the
requisite period. It is true that the 1966 Act
provided that employment with the United
States Government or with an international
organization, as defined in 22 U.S.C. § 288,
satisfied the physical presence requirement.
But Morales–Santana's argument lacks merit
because his father's employment with the
South Porto Rico Sugar Company, a
multinational company, did not constitute
employment with the United States
Government. Nor did it constitute
employment
with
an
international
organization as defined in 22 U.S.C. § 288,
since the South Porto Rico Sugar Company
was neither “a public international
organization in which the United States
participates pursuant to any treaty or under
the authority of any Act of Congress
authorizing such participation or making an
appropriation for such participation,” nor
“designated by the President” as such.
As his final statutory argument, Morales–
Santana contends that the Dominican
Republic was an “outlying possession” of the
United States for purposes of the 1952 Act
when Morales–Santana's father was there in
1919. Two factors convince us that Congress
did not intend to include the Dominican
Republic within the scope of the term
“outlying possession” in § 1401.4
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First, there is no treaty or lease pursuant to
which the Dominican Republic was acquired.
This stands in contrast to the Philippines,
Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands, all of which were acquired by the
United States by treaty, and all of which were
outlying possessions when the United States
exercised sovereignty over them. The case of
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is a little different in
that it involves both a lease and a treaty, but
it yields the same result vis-à-vis the
Dominican Republic. In Boumediene v. Bush,
the Supreme Court determined that the
“complete jurisdiction and control” by the
United States over Guantanamo Bay
constituted “de facto ” sovereignty over it.
The Court added, though, that in a 1903
Lease Agreement between Cuba and the
United States, the former granted the latter
“complete jurisdiction and control” over
Guantanamo Bay and that “[u]nder the terms
of [a] 1934 [t]reaty, ... Cuba effectively has
no rights as a sovereign until the parties agree
to modification of the 1903 Lease Agreement
or the United States abandons” Guantanamo
Bay. By contrast, there is no lease or treaty
that conferred to the United States de facto or
de jure sovereignty over the Dominican
Republic.
Second, we acknowledge the historical fact
that the United States exercised significant
control during its military occupation of the
Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924. But
that control did not extinguish the
sovereignty of the Dominican Republic.
Indeed, the Proclamation of the Military
Occupation of Santo Domingo by the United
States specifically declared that the purpose
of the temporary military occupation was “to
give aid to [the Dominican Republic] in
returning to a condition of internal order”
without “destroying the sovereignty of” the
Dominican Republic.

Having rejected Morales–Santana's statutory
arguments for derivative citizenship, we now
consider his constitutional equal protection
argument.
II. Equal Protection
Morales–Santana argues principally that the
1952 Act's treatment of derivative citizenship
conferral rights violates the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.5
As we have explained, under the 1952 Act,
an unwed citizen mother confers her
citizenship on her child (born abroad to a
non-citizen biological father) so long as she
has satisfied the one-year continuous
presence requirement prior to the child's
birth. The single year of presence by the
mother can occur at any time prior to the
child's birth—including, for example, from
the mother's first birthday until her second
birthday. An unwed citizen father, by
contrast, faces much more stringent
requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a),
which incorporates § 1401(a)(7). He is
prevented from transmitting his citizenship
(to his child born abroad to a non-citizen
mother) unless he was physically present in
the United States or an outlying possession
prior to the child's birth for a total of at least
ten years. Because five of those years must
follow the father's fourteenth birthday, an
unwed citizen father cannot transmit his
citizenship to his child born abroad to a noncitizen mother before the father's nineteenth
birthday. Eighteen-year-old citizen fathers
and their children are out of luck.
As both parties agree, had Morales–Santana's
mother, rather than his father, been a citizen
continuously present in Puerto Rico until 20
days prior to her nineteenth birthday, she
would have satisfied the requirements to
confer derivative citizenship on her child. It
is this gender-based difference in treatment
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that Morales–Santana claims violated his
father's right to equal protection.
The Government asserts that the difference is
justified by two interests: (1) ensuring a
sufficient connection between citizen
children and the United States, and (2)
avoiding statelessness. In what follows, we
apply intermediate scrutiny to assess these
asserted interests, and we conclude that
neither interest is advanced by the statute's
gender-based
physical
presence
requirements. After determining that these
physical presence requirements violate equal
protection, we apply the statute's severance
clause and determine that Morales–Santana,
under the statute stripped of its constitutional
defect, has citizenship as of his birth.
A. Level of Scrutiny
We apply intermediate, “heightened”
scrutiny to laws that discriminate on the basis
of gender. Under intermediate scrutiny, the
government classification must serve actual
and important governmental objectives, and
the discriminatory means employed must be
substantially related to the achievement of
those
objectives.
Furthermore,
the
justification for the challenged classification
“must be genuine, not hypothesized or
invented post hoc in response to litigation.
And it must not rely on overbroad
generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and
females.”
In urging us to apply rational basis scrutiny
instead, the Government relies on Fiallo v.
Bell. In Fiallo, the Supreme Court applied
rational basis scrutiny to a section of the 1952
Act that gave special preference for
admission into the United States to noncitizens born out of wedlock seeking entry by
virtue of a relationship with their citizen
mothers, but not to similarly situated non-

citizens seeking entry by virtue of a
relationship with their citizen fathers. The
Court reasoned that rational basis scrutiny
was warranted because “over no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress
more complete than it is over the admission
of aliens,” and “[o]ur cases have long
recognized the power to expel or exclude
aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute
exercised by the Government's political
departments.”
But Fiallo is distinguishable. In Fiallo, the
children's alienage implicated Congress's
“exceptionally broad power” to admit or
remove non-citizens. Here, by contrast, there
is no similar issue of alienage that would
trigger special deference. Because Morales–
Santana
instead
claims
pre-existing
citizenship at birth, his challenge does not
implicate Congress's “power to admit or
exclude foreigners,” and therefore is not
governed by Fiallo.
Our view of Fiallo's limited scope is
grounded in Supreme Court and circuit
caselaw. As an initial matter, we note that the
Supreme Court has never applied the
deferential Fiallo standard to issues of gender
discrimination under § 1409, despite being
asked to do so on at least three occasions.
Justice Stevens' opinion in Miller succinctly
described Fiallo's limitation: “It is of
significance that the petitioner in this case,
unlike the petitioners in Fiallo, ... is not
challenging the denial of an application for
special [immigration] status. She is
contesting the Government's refusal to ...
treat her as a citizen. If she were to prevail,
the judgment ... would confirm her preexisting citizenship.”
Although no opinion in Miller received a
majority of votes, we observed in Lake v.
Reno that “seven justices in Miller would
have applied heightened scrutiny ... [to INA]
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section 309(a).” Later, in Lewis v. Thompson,
we explained Lake's holding in a way that
makes it clear that heightened scrutiny, rather
than Fiallo's more deferential standard of
review, should apply to Morales–Santana's
claim: “[W]e have already held in Lake,
drawing an inference from the various
opinions of the Justices in Miller, that citizen
claimants with an equal protection claim
deserving of heightened scrutiny do not lose
that favorable form of review simply because
the case arises in the context of immigration.”
Our sister circuits that have considered
Fiallo's application to claims similar to
Morales–Santana's are in accord.
For these reasons, we conclude that the
gender-based scheme in §§ 1401 and 1409
can be upheld only if the Government shows
that it is substantially related to an actual and
important governmental objective. In
assessing the validity of the gender-based
classification, moreover, we consider the
existence of gender-neutral alternatives to the
classification.
B. Governmental Interests and Tailoring
Having determined that intermediate scrutiny
applies, we examine the two interests that the
Government claims support the statute's
gender-based distinction.
1. Ensuring a Sufficient Connection Between
the Child and the United States
The Government asserts that Congress
passed the 1952 Act's physical presence
requirements in order to “ensur[e] that
foreign-born children of parents of different
nationalities have a sufficient connection to
the United States to warrant citizenship.” As
both parties agree, this interest is important,
and Congress actually had it in mind when
requiring some period of physical presence

before a citizen parent could confer
citizenship on his or her child born abroad.
The Government invokes this important
interest but fails to justify the 1952 Act's
different treatment of mothers and fathers by
reference to it. It offers no reason, and we see
no reason, that unwed fathers need more time
than unwed mothers in the United States prior
to their child's birth in order to assimilate the
values that the statute seeks to ensure are
passed on to citizen children born abroad.
We recognize that our determination
conflicts with the decision of the Ninth
Circuit in Flores–Villar which addressed the
same statutory provisions and discussed the
same governmental interest in ensuring a
connection between child and country. The
Ninth Circuit concluded that in addition to
preventing or reducing statelessness—an
objective we address below—“[t]he
residence differential ... furthers the objective
of developing a tie between the child, his or
her father, and this country.” The Ninth
Circuit provided no explanation for its
conclusion, and the Government provides
none here.
Instead, the Government relies on Nguyen to
explain why the different physical presence
requirements for unwed men and women
reflect a concern with ensuring an adequate
connection between the child and the United
States. We are not persuaded. In Nguyen, the
Court upheld the Immigration and
Nationality Act's requirement that a citizen
father seeking to confer derivative citizenship
on his foreign-born child take the affirmative
step of either legitimating the child, declaring
paternity under oath, or obtaining a court
order of paternity. The Nguyen Court
determined that two interests supported the
legitimation requirement for citizen fathers of
children born abroad.
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The first interest, “assuring that a biological
parent-child relationship exists,” is irrelevant
to the 1952 Act's physical presence
requirements because derivative citizenship
separately requires unwed citizen fathers to
have legitimated their foreign-born children.
Here, Morales–Santana's father established
his biological tie to Morales–Santana by
legitimating him. His physical presence in
Puerto Rico for ten years as opposed to one
year prior to Morales–Santana's birth would
have provided no additional assurance that a
biological tie existed.
The Nguyen Court identified a second
interest in ensuring “that the child and the
citizen parent have some demonstrated
opportunity or potential to develop” a “real,
meaningful relationship.” The Court
explained that a biological mother, by virtue
of giving birth to the child, “knows that the
child is in being and is hers,” but that an
unwed biological father might in some cases
not even “know that a child was conceived,
nor is it always clear that even the mother will
be sure of the father's identity.” Rather than
requiring a case-by-case analysis of whether
a father or a mother has a “real, meaningful
relationship” with a child born abroad,
“Congress enacted an easily administered
scheme to promote the different but still
substantial interest of ensuring at least an
opportunity for a parent-child relationship to
develop.” This interest in ensuring the
“opportunity for a real, meaningful
relationship” between parent and child is
likewise not relevant to the 1952 Act's
physical
presence
requirements.
By
legitimating his son, Morales–Santana's
father took the affirmative step of
demonstrating that an opportunity for a
meaningful relationship existed. And again,
requiring that Morales–Santana's father be
physically present in Puerto Rico prior to
Morales–Santana's birth for ten years instead
of one year would have done nothing to

further ensure that an opportunity for such a
relationship existed.
So we agree that unwed mothers and fathers
are not similarly situated with respect to the
two types of parent-to-child “ties” justifying
the legitimation requirement at issue in
Nguyen. But unwed mothers and fathers are
similarly situated with respect to how long
they should be present in the United States or
an outlying possession prior to the child's
birth in order to have assimilated citizenshiprelated values to transmit to the child.
Therefore, the statute's gender-based
distinction is not substantially related to the
goal of ensuring a sufficient connection
between citizen children and the United
States.
2. Preventing Statelessness
Having concluded that the Government's
interest in establishing a connection between
the foreign-born child and the United States
does not explain or justify the gender-based
distinction in the 1952 Act's physical
presence requirements, we now turn to the
Government's other asserted interest. The
Government argues that Congress enacted
different physical presence requirements in §
1409(a) (incorporating § 1401(a)(7)) and §
1409(c) to reduce the level of statelessness
among newborns. For example, a child born
out of wedlock abroad may be stateless if he
is born inside a country that does not confer
citizenship based on place of birth and neither
of the child's parents conferred derivative
citizenship on him.
The avoidance of statelessness is clearly an
important governmental interest. Contrary to
the Government's claim, though, avoidance
of statelessness does not appear to have been
Congress's actual purpose in establishing the
physical presence requirements in the 1952
Act, and in any event the gender-based
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distinctions in the 1952 Act's physical
presence requirements are not substantially
related to that objective.
a. Actual Purpose
Some historical background is useful to
understand
Congress's
purpose
in
establishing the 1952 Act's gender-based
physical presence requirements. Until 1940,
a citizen father whose child was born abroad
transmitted his citizenship to that child if the
father had resided in the United States for any
period of time prior to the child's birth.
Consistent with common law notions of
coverture, and with the notion that the
husband determined the political and cultural
character of his dependents (wife and
children included), prior to 1934 married
women had no statutory right to confer their
own citizenship. But for unmarried citizen
mothers, the State Department's practice
since at least 1912 was to grant citizenship to
their foreign-born children on the theory that
an unmarried mother “stands in the place of
the father” and is in any event “bound to
maintain [the child] as its natural guardian.”
In 1940 Congress for the first time explicitly
addressed the situation of children born out
of wedlock. It enacted Section 205 of the
1940 Act, which provided that citizen fathers
and married citizen mothers could transmit
citizenship to their child born abroad only
after satisfying an age-calibrated ten-year
physical presence requirement, but that
unmarried citizen mothers could confer
citizenship if they had resided in the United
States at any point prior to the child's birth.
The 1952 Act retained this basic statutory
structure, though it imposed a somewhat
more stringent requirement that unmarried
mothers have been physically present in the
United States for a continuous period of one
year in order to confer citizenship.

Neither the congressional hearings nor the
relevant congressional reports concerning the
1940 Act contain any reference to the
problem of statelessness for children born
abroad.
The
congressional
hearings
concerning the 1952 Act are similarly silent
about statelessness as a driving concern.10
Notwithstanding the absence of relevant
discussion concerning the problem of
statelessness for children born abroad in the
legislative history, the Government points to
the
Executive
Branch's
explanatory
comments to Section 204 of the proposed
nationality code that Congress would
ultimately enact as the 1940 Act. These
comments refer to a 1935 law review article
entitled A Comparative Study of Laws
Relating to Nationality at Birth and to Loss of
Nationality by Durward V. Sandifer.
According to the article, in 1935
approximately thirty countries had statutes
assigning children born out of wedlock the
citizenship of their mother. From the
comments and the article, the Government
urges us to infer that “Congress was aware”
there existed “a substantial risk that a child
born to an unwed U.S. citizen mother in a
country employing [laws determining
citizenship based on lineage, rather than
place of birth] would be stateless at birth
unless the mother could pass her citizenship
to her child,” and that this risk was “unique”
to the children of unwed citizen mothers.
Based on our review of the Executive
Branch's explanatory comments and the
Sandifer article, we decline the Government's
invitation. The explanatory comments do not
mention statelessness and do not refer to the
Sandifer article's discussion of statelessness.
In any event, the Sandifer article itself does
not support the Government's argument that
the children of unwed citizen mothers faced a
greater risk of statelessness than the children
of unwed citizen fathers.
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While the Executive Branch's comments
ignore the problem of statelessness, they
arguably reflect gender-based generalizations
concerning who would care for and be
associated with a child born out of wedlock.
Other
contemporary
administrative
memoranda similarly ignore the risk of
statelessness for children born out of wedlock
abroad to citizen mothers.
In sum, we discern no evidence (1) that
Congress enacted the 1952 Act's genderbased physical presence requirements out of
a concern for statelessness, (2) that the
problem of statelessness was in fact greater
for children of unwed citizen mothers than
for children of unwed citizen fathers, or (3)
that Congress believed that the problem of
statelessness was greater for children of
unwed citizen mothers than for children of
unwed citizen fathers. We conclude that
neither reason nor history supports the
Government's contention that the 1952 Act's
gender-based physical presence requirements
were motivated by a concern for
statelessness, as opposed to impermissible
stereotyping.
b. Substantial Relationship Between Ends
and Means
Even assuming for the sake of argument that
preventing statelessness was Congress's
actual motivating concern when it enacted
the physical presence requirements, we are
persuaded by the availability of effective
gender-neutral alternatives that the genderbased distinction between § 1409(a)
(incorporating § 1401(a)(7)) and § 1409(c)
cannot survive intermediate scrutiny. As far
back as 1933, Secretary of State Cordell Hull
proposed just such a gender-neutral
alternative in a letter to the Chairman of the
House Committee on Immigration and
Naturalization. Secretary Hull suggested that
the immigration laws be revised “to obtain

the objective of parity between the sexes in
nationality matters” by “remov [ing] ...
discrimination between” mothers and fathers
“with regard to the transmission of
citizenship to children born abroad.” Hull
proposed the following language:
PROPOSED AMENDMENT ...
(d) A child hereafter born out of
wedlock beyond the limits and
jurisdiction of the United States and
its outlying possessions to an
American parent who has resided in
the United States and its outlying
possessions, there being no other
legal parent under the law of the place
of birth, shall have the nationality of
such American parent.
And unlike the legitimation requirement at
issue in Nguyen, which could be satisfied by,
for example, “a written acknowledgment of
paternity under oath,” the physical presence
requirement
that
Morales–Santana
challenges imposes more than a “minimal”
burden on unwed citizen fathers. It adds to
the legitimation requirement ten years of
physical presence in the United States, five of
which must be after the age of fourteen. In
our view, this burden on a citizen father's
right to confer citizenship on his foreign-born
child is substantial.
For these reasons, the gender-based
distinction at the heart of the 1952 Act's
physical presence requirements is not
substantially related to the achievement of a
permissible, non-stereotype-based objective.
3. Remedy
We now turn to the most vexing problem in
this case. Here, two statutory provisions— §
1409(c) and (a)18—combine to violate equal
protection. What is the remedy for this
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violation of equal protection, where
citizenship is at stake? Ordinarily, “when the
‘right invoked is that to equal treatment,’ the
appropriate remedy is a mandate of equal
treatment, a result that can be accomplished
by withdrawal of benefits from the favored
class as well as by extension of benefits to the
excluded class.”
As we see it, “equal treatment” might be
achieved in any one of three ways: (1)
striking both § 1409(c) and (a) entirely; (2)
severing the one-year continuous presence
provision in § 1409(c) and requiring every
unwed citizen parent to satisfy the more
onerous ten-year requirement if the other
parent lacks citizenship; or (3) severing the
ten-year requirement in §§ 1409(a) and
1401(a)(7) and requiring every unwed citizen
parent to satisfy the less onerous one-year
continuous presence requirement if the other
parent lacks citizenship. In selecting among
these three options, we look to the intent of
Congress in enacting the 1952 Act. For
reasons we explain below, we conclude that
the third option is most consistent with
congressional intent.
We eliminate the first option with ease. The
1952 Act contains a severance clause that
provides: “If any particular provision of this
Act, or the application thereof to any person
or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of the Act ... shall not be affected
thereby.” The clause makes clear that only
one of the provisions in § 1409, rather than
both, should be severed as constitutionally
infirm. It also means that our holding, which
relates only to the application of these
provisions to unmarried parents, should not
be construed to affect the physical presence
requirement for married parents.
We reject the second option—contracting, as
opposed to extending, the right to derivative
citizenship—with more circumspection. The

Government urges us to adopt this option,
arguing that the alternative allows the
exception for unwed mothers to swallow the
rule, thereby inflicting more damage to the
statute's language and structure and reflecting
a more radical change than the 1952
Congress intended. This argument fails for
two
reasons.
First,
the
argument
misunderstands our task, which is not to
devise the “cleanest” way to alter the wording
and structure of the statute, but to determine
what result Congress intended in the event
the combined statutory provisions were
deemed unconstitutional. Second, the
Government's argument neglects the
historical background against which
Congress enacted the relevant provisions.
Although a close call, history does not
convince us that the members of Congress
passing the 1952 Act would have viewed the
extension of the one-year requirement as a
more radical change than the alternative, in
which all unwed citizen parents must satisfy
the ten-year age-calibrated requirement if the
other parent lacks citizenship. To the
contrary, the ten-year requirement for fathers
and married mothers imposed by Congress in
1940 appears to have represented a
significant departure from long-established
historical practice. From 1934 until the
enactment of the 1940 Act, for example,
women had the statutory right to confer
citizenship on their foreign-born children and
were required merely to have resided in the
United States for any duration prior to the
child's birth. The same bare-minimum
requirement applied to men for the vast
majority of the time since the founding, from
1790 until 1940. Moreover, the 1952 Act's
addition of a one-year continuous physical
presence requirement for unmarried citizen
mothers represented a relatively minor
change in the baseline minimal residency
requirement applicable to all men and women
prior to 1940. On the other hand, of course,
we recognize that the 1952 Congress,
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presumably with the benefit of this long
history, nevertheless decided to retain the
ten-year residency requirement. Whether this
related to the emergence of the United States
as a world power after World War II or an
increasing number of children born of mixednationality parents, or some other set of
factors, we cannot tell with confidence.
Neither the text nor the legislative history of
the 1952 Act is especially helpful or clear on
this point, and ultimately what tips the
balance for us is the binding precedent that
cautions us to extend rather than contract
benefits in the face of ambiguous
congressional intent. Indeed, we are unaware
of a single case in which the Supreme Court
has contracted, rather than extended, benefits
when curing an equal protection violation
through severance.
Lastly, the Government contends that, in
giving Morales–Santana the relief he seeks,
we are granting citizenship, which we lack
the power to do. This argument rests on a
mistaken premise. Although courts have no
power to confer “citizenship on a basis other
than that prescribed by Congress,” Morales–
Santana has not asked us to confer
citizenship, and we do not do so. Instead,
Morales–Santana asks that we exercise our
traditional remedial powers “so that the

statute, free of its constitutional defect, can
operate to determine whether citizenship was
transmitted at birth.” In other words, if
Morales–Santana “were to prevail, the
judgment in [his] favor would confirm [his]
pre-existing citizenship rather than grant
[him] rights that [he] does not now possess.”
Correcting the constitutional defect here
would at a minimum entail replacing the tenyear physical presence requirement in §
1401(a)(7) (and incorporated within §
1409(a)) with the one-year continuous
presence requirement in § 1409(c). The
alternative remedy suggested by the
Government—that all unwed parents be
subject to the more onerous ten-year
requirement—would
prove
no
less
controversial: we have no more power to strip
citizenship conferred by Congress than to
confer it. Nor, finally, has Congress
authorized us to avoid the question.
Conforming the immigration laws Congress
enacted with the Constitution's guarantee of
equal protection, we conclude that Morales–
Santana is a citizen as of his birth.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the
BIA's decision and REMAND for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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“Gender-Based Citizenship Law Gets U.S. Supreme Court Review”
Bloomberg
Greg Stohr
June 28, 2016

The U.S. Supreme Court will consider the
constitutionality of a provision in federal law
that makes it harder for some foreign-born
children of American men to become citizens
than children born abroad to American
women.

The Supreme Court tried and failed to resolve
the issue five years ago, splitting 4-4 in a
similar case. Justice Elena Kagan wasn’t able
to take part in that dispute, presumably
because she had been involved as an Obama
administration lawyer.

The nation’s highest court agreed to hear the
Obama administration’s appeal of a ruling
that conferred citizenship on Luis Ramon
Morales-Santana, a man born in the
Dominican Republic who was facing
deportation after being convicted of a 1995
robbery and attempted murder in New York.

The new case is Lynch v. Morales-Santana,
15-1191.

Under federal law, a child born abroad to an
unmarried American mother and nonAmerican father can claim U.S. citizenship if
the mother lived continuously in the U.S. for
a year at some point before the birth. The
residency requirements are more stringent if
the father is American and the mother isn’t.
A New York-based federal appeals court said
the distinction amounted to unconstitutional
discrimination on the basis of gender. The
panel said Morales-Santana, born in 1962 to
a Dominican mother and a American father,
was entitled to invoke the more lenient rules
that would have applied had his mother been
the U.S. citizen.
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“Supreme Court citizenship case: Should the genders of parents'
matter?”
Christian Science Monitor
Christina Beck
June 28, 2016

The Supreme Court announced Tuesday that
it will consider whether or not United States
citizenship law that favors children of unwed
American mothers over those with unwed
American fathers is a gender-based violation
of the US Constitution's equal rights
provision.
If children born abroad have unwed parents,
and only one is an American citizen, current
immigration law gives different treatment
depending on the gender of the American
parent. Despite attempts at reform, children
of unwed American mothers today have an
easier time gaining US citizenship than the
children of American fathers.
This disparity will come before the court
through the case of Luis Ramon MoralesSantana, the son of an American citizen
father, who was denied American citizenship.
Under current law, American fathers are
required to spend at least five years living in
the United States before their children born
abroad and out of wedlock are allowed to
seek citizenship. (A 2012 amendment
lowered the time requirement from ten
years.) American women, however, are only
required to prove that they have lived in the

United States for one year before their
children can seek citizenship.
In July 2015, the second US Court of Appeals
in New York struck down the law, saying that
the rule was an example of "impermissible
stereotyping," and that it imposed an unfair
burden on fathers. After the US Justice
Department's loss at the appellate level in
New York, the department took the case to
the Supreme Court.
Since 2000, the US has been trying to deport
Mr. Morales-Santana, who was born in 1962
in the Dominican Republic and has legally
lived in the US since 1975. In 1995, he was
convicted of four counts of attempted murder
and two counts of robbery.
Morales-Santana’s now-deceased father
missed the five year residency cut off by just
twenty days, he said. His parents married in
1970. Morales-Santana argues that his father
should have legally been considered a
resident for the entire five year period,
including his time in the Dominican
Republic, since he was working for a USowned company. In 2015, the 2nd Court of
Appeals in New York rejected his four
arguments for derivative citizenship.
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He had also claimed, however, that the
different rules for mothers' and fathers'
residence in the US violated his father's right
to equal protection. The court ruled that the
1952 Nationality Act’s different genderbased residency requirements did nothing to
advance the government’s stated interests
with the Act: avoiding statelessness and
ensuring a sufficient connection between
citizen children and the United States.

Conservative critics also say that this
decision could be a slippery slope, leading to
widespread judicial amnesty for non-citizens.
The Supreme Court will hear the case in the
next cycle, and will issue a ruling before June
2017. The last time the court ruled on a
similar case it came to a split 4-4 decision
after Justice Elena Kagan recused herself,
likely because of her previous position in the
Justice Department.

Critics of the 2nd Circuit Court’s decision
argue that the Constitution’s Equal Protection
clause should not apply to foreign citizens,
saying that Congress has the right to establish
any rule it wants regarding the residency
requirements for US citizens and their
offspring.
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“Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Birthright Citizenship Case”
Jackson Lewis Immigration Blog
Maggie Murphy
June 28, 2016

The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to decide
whether a man born outside the U.S., out of
wedlock, to a U.S. citizen father and a
noncitizen mother could benefit from
birthright citizenship. A decision in this case
can mean protection from deportation for
many. Lynch v. Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d
520 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted (U.S. June
28, 2016) (No. 15-1191).
Birthright citizenship laws have changed
throughout the years, and when deciding
whether someone is entitled to citizenship by
birth, one must review the laws in place at the
time of his birth. Luis Ramon MoralesSantana was born outside the U.S. to unwed
parents – his mother was a noncitizen and his
father was a U.S. citizen. At that time, the
laws in place prohibited the transmission of
citizenship to Morales-Santana by his U.S.
citizen father.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in New York, granted MoralesSantana citizenship, ruling that fathers should
have the same benefits as mothers under the
statute. The Court held that the citizenship
rule applied “archaic and overbroad
stereotypes” to parenting roles for children
born to unwed parents and violated equal
protection rights. The U.S. Department of
Justice asked the Supreme Court to reverse

this opinion, arguing that a court cannot
create new citizenship rules and regulations.
Citizenship laws can be very confusing.
Under current citizenship laws for children
born out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen father
and a noncitizen mother, the child benefits
from birthright citizenship if the father is
physically present in the U.S. five years prior
to the child’s birth, two of which are after the
age of 14 (military service counts). The child
can also benefit from birthright citizenship if
a blood relationship is established, the father
agrees to support the child until he or she is
18, and, while the child is under 18, one of
three factors is met: (1) the child is
legitimated; (2) the father acknowledges
paternity; or (3) paternity is established by
court adjudication.
The Supreme Court reviewed a similar case
several years ago, when the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San
Francisco,
upheld
the
citizenship
transmission rules. At that time, Justice Elena
Kagan had to recuse herself, and the decision
was 4 – 4.
Jackson Lewis will report on the Supreme
Court’s decision, expected by June 2017. If
the Court upholds the Second Circuit
decision, ruling in favor of equal protection
for fathers, it could result in citizenship rights
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for thousands of individuals born abroad to
U.S. citizen fathers and may provide
remedies to individuals currently facing
deportation.
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“2nd Circ. Axes Citizenship Rule Weighted Against Fathers”
Law360
Allissa Wickham
July 8, 2015

The Second Circuit ruled Wednesday that
strict citizenship requirements for a child
born outside the U.S. to an unmarried citizen
father and non‐citizen mother ran afoul of the
Fifth Amendment, finding that a green card
holder fighting deportation had actually
derived citizenship at birth through his father.

However, if child’s parents are an unwed
citizen father and non‐citizen mother, he has
citizenship only if the dad was present in the
U.S. or related territory before the child was
born for at least 10 years, with at least five of
those years occurring after age of 14, the
court said.

A three-judge panel for the Second Circuit,
which included U.S. District Judge Jed
Rakoff sitting by designation, found that
petitioner Luis Ramon Morales‐Santana is a
citizen by birth, and reversed the Board of
Immigration Appeals' denial of his bid to
reopen removal proceedings.

Morales‐Santana, whose dad satisfied the
citizenship conferral requirements for
unmarried mothers but not for fathers,
claimed this gendered difference violated the
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection, and claimed unwed fathers should
have the same benefits given to unwed
mothers under the statute. The Second Circuit
panel agreed, in an opinion authored by
Circuit Judge Raymond Lohier Jr.

The case deals with a gender discrepancy
between how citizenship is given to children
born abroad to unwed parents, based on
whether the mother or father was a noncitizen.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952, which was the law in effect when
Morales‐Santana was born, a child born
outside the U.S. to an unmarried citizen
mother and non‐citizen father has citizenship
at birth if the mother was present in the U.S.
or one of its territories for a continuous period
of at least a year before the child was born,
according to the Second Circuit.

“We agree and hold that Morales‐Santana
derived citizenship at birth through his
father,” Lohier wrote.
Morales‐Santana was born in the Dominican
Republic in 1962 and is the child of a U.S.
citizen father and a Dominican mother.
Although he entered the U.S. as a green card
holder in 1975, he was placed in deportation
proceedings in 2000 after having been
convicted of felonies, the court said.
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Although he applied for withholding of
removal based on derivative citizenship
secured through his father, Morales‐Santana
was rebuffed by both an immigration judge
and the BIA.
According to Morales‐Santana’s attorney,
Stephen Broome of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
& Sullivan LLP, his client was initially
proceeding before the appeals court pro se,
before Broome was appointed to the case.
Broome described the litigation as “hardfought,” with briefings that cited letters of
executive agencies going back to the 1920s.
“When you’re challenging an immigration
statute under the equal protection clause, I
think ... that’s an uphill battle, but I think the
result they reached is 100 percent right,”
Broome said, adding that he was “thrilled”
with the decision.
Broome said the current version of the INA is
still discriminatory in that unwed citizen
mothers face a one-year physical
requirement, while unwed citizen fathers face
an age-calibrated presence requirement that
is much higher.

As Broome pointed out, that ruling was
ultimately upheld in a 4-4 Supreme Court
decision after Justice Elena Kagan recused
herself, possibly because she was solicitor
general at the time of the Ninth Circuit
appeal. Having not definitively ruled on the
issue and now facing a circuit split, the high
court may be tempted to take up this case if
the government should appeal, Broome said.
A representative for the U.S. Department of
Justice did not respond to a request for
comment Wednesday.
Morales‐Santana is represented by Stephen
Broome and Todd Anten of Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, who handled the
case pro bono.
Attorney General Loretta Lynch is
represented by Kathryn M. McKinney,
Janette L. Allen and Imran Raza Zaidi of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
The case is Morales-Santana v. Lynch, case
number 11-1252, at the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Although the court was only analyzing the
version of the INA that was in effect when
Morales‐Santana was born, its reasoning
would apply equally to the current law,
according to Broome.
Notably, the Second Circuit’s decision
conflicts with the Ninth Circuit’s 2008
holding in Flores‐Villar, which upheld the
residence requirements on U.S. citizen
fathers’ ability to transmit citizenship to kids
born abroad outside of marriage to a noncitizen.
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United States v. Texas
15-674
Ruling Below: Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015)
Several states sought injunctive relief against the implementation of Deferred Action for Parents
of Americans and Lawful permanent Residents and Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. The
District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted preliminary injunctive relief on the
grounds that implementation would likely violate the Administrative Procedure Act. The
government appealed and filed for a stay or narrowing of scope. The Court of Appeals denied the
motion, then later issued a holding. The CoA held that states had special solicitude in
determining Article III standing, that Texas satisfied injury element for Art. III standing, that
review was available under the Administrative Procedure Act, that Texas was likely to succeed
on merits of claim with regards to policy-directive exemption and agency-rule exemption under
the APA and on merits of substantive APA claim. Thus, preliminary injunction was warranted.
The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the Court of Appeals due to a split 4-4 decision. The
US Department of Justice has asked the Supreme Court to rehear the case, on the grounds that a
definitive decision by a full Court is necessary.
Question Presented: Whether a state that voluntarily provides a subsidy to all aliens with
deferred action has Article III standing and a justiciable cause of action under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) to challenge the Secretary of Homeland Security’s guidance seeking to
establish a process for considering deferred action for certain aliens because it will lead to more
aliens having deferred action; whether the guidance is arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not
in accordance with law; whether the guidance was subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment
procedures; and whether the guidance violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, Article
II, section 3.

UNITED STATES, et al., Petitioners
v.
TEXAS, et al.
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided on June 23, 2016
The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
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“White House Asks Supreme Court for New Review of Immigration
Policy With 9 Justices”
The Wall Street Journal
Jess Bravin
July 18, 2016

The Obama administration moved Monday to
expedite future Supreme Court review of its
immigration policy, asking the court to rehear
the issue as soon as a ninth justice is seated.
Last month the Supreme Court deadlocked 44 over the administration’s appeal of lower
court orders that stymied its plans to grant
work authorization to more than four million
illegal immigrants whose children are U.S.
citizens or lawful residents. The tie vote left
intact a decision of the Fifth U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals in New Orleans, which
froze the plan while a Texas-led coalition of
Republican-leaning states pursued litigation
contending the program exceeds the
administration’s authority.
The immigration case was one of four
Supreme Court deadlocks since the February
death of conservative Justice Antonin Scalia.
President Barack Obama nominated U.S.
Judge Merrick Garland to replace Justice
Scalia. But Senate Republicans have declined
to act on the nomination and said the decision
should wait for the next president.
The request, made in a motion for rehearing,
could allow the case to return to the Supreme
Court’s docket more quickly than waiting for

the litigation to make a second journey
through federal trial and appellate courts.
In its petition, the Justice Department
acknowledged that “ordinarily, it is
exceedingly rare for this Court to grant
rehearing” after a decision has been issued.
But it said that on several occasions the court
has agreed to rehear a case when a deadlock
was caused by a temporary vacancy.
“In such situations, the court has not
infrequently held the case over the court’s
summer recess, holding oral arguments
months later,” the department said.
For example, after Justice Benjamin Cardozo
died in 1938, the court deadlocked in a case
concerning the seizure of an automobile that
illegally transported liquor. The court granted
the government’s petition for rehearing,
“then heard the case after Justice [Felix]
Frankfurter was confirmed” the following
year.
The Justice Department said it was more
important to rehear the immigration case than
the other 2016 deadlocks, because of its
national importance and the fact that the issue
couldn’t return to the court in different cases
filed by private parties.
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“Unless the court resolves this case in a
precedential manner, a matter of ‘great
national
importance’
involving
an
‘unprecedented and momentous’ injunction
barring implementation of the [immigration
policy] will have been effectively resolved
for the country as a whole by a court of
appeals that has divided twice,” the Justice
Department said.
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“Obama administration asks Supreme Court to reconsider immigration
plan”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes
July 18, 2016

The Obama administration asked the
Supreme Court Monday to reconsider the
president’s plan to shield millions of
undocumented immigrants from deportation
once the court again has nine members.
The court last month said it was split 4 to 4
on whether lower courts were correct when
they blocked implementation of President
Obama’s plan, which he announced in 2014
after Congress failed to pass comprehensive
immigration reform. Obama’s plan would
have shielded those who have been in the
country for years without committing serious
crimes and have family ties to those here
legally.

courts without definitive Supreme Court
review.
But the court itself could have held the case
for a rehearing and decided not to.
And as a practical matter, it will be the next
president who decides either to endorse or
even expand Obama’s executive action, as
Democrat Hillary Clinton has said she will
do, or end it, as Republican Donald Trump
has vowed.

The request is a long shot, and Acting
Solicitor General Ian Heath Gershengorn
acknowledged in the filing that it is
“exceedingly rare” for the court to grant such
a petition.
But the action draws attention to the fact that
the Republican Senate has not agreed to a
hearing or vote on Judge Merrick Garland,
Obama’s nominee to fill the seat of Justice
Antonin Scalia, who died in February.
The petition said an issue as important as
immigration should not be decided by lower
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“Supreme Court Tie Blocks Obama Immigration Plan”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak and Michael D. Shear
June 23, 2016

The Supreme Court announced on Thursday
that it had deadlocked in a case challenging
President Obama’s immigration plan,
effectively ending what Mr. Obama had
hoped would become one of his central
legacies. The program would have shielded
as many as five million undocumented
immigrants from deportation and allowed
them to legally work in the United States.

The president spoke after the 4-4 ruling by
the Supreme Court on Thursday that deals a
blow to his plan to spare millions of illegal
immigrants from deportation.

The 4-4 tie, which left in place an appeals
court ruling blocking the plan, amplified the
contentious election-year debate over the
nation’s immigration policy and presidential
power.

“Today’s decision is frustrating to those who
seek to grow our economy and bring a
rationality to our immigration system,” he
said before heading to the West Coast for a
two-day trip. “It is heartbreaking for the
millions of immigrants who have made their
lives here.”

When the Supreme Court agreed to hear the
case in January, it seemed poised to issue a
major ruling on presidential power. That did
not materialize, but the court’s action, which
established no precedent and included no
reasoning, was nonetheless perhaps its most
important statement this term.
The decision was just nine words long: “The
judgment is affirmed by an equally divided
court.”
But its consequences will be vast, said Walter
Dellinger, who was acting solicitor general in
the Clinton administration. “Seldom have the
hopes of so many been crushed by so few
words,” he said.

Speaking at the White House, Mr. Obama
described the ruling as a deep disappointment
for immigrants who would not be able to
emerge from the threat of deportation for at
least the balance of his term.

The decision was one of two determined by
tie votes Thursday — the other concerned
Indian tribal courts — and one of four so far
this term. The court is scheduled to issue its
final three decisions of the term, including
one on a restrictive Texas abortion law, on
Monday.
Mr. Obama said the court’s immigration
ruling was a stark reminder of the
consequences of Republicans’ refusal to
consider Judge Merrick B. Garland, the
president’s nominee to fill the vacancy on the
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Supreme Court created by the death of Justice
Antonin Scalia.
“If you keep on blocking judges from getting
on the bench, then courts can’t issue
decisions,” Mr. Obama said. “And what that
means is then you are going to have the status
quo frozen, and we are not able to make
progress on some very important issues.”
The case, United States v. Texas, No. 15-674,
concerned a 2014 executive action by the
president to allow as many as five million
unauthorized immigrants who were the
parents of citizens or of lawful permanent
residents to apply for a program that would
spare them from deportation and provide
them with work permits. The program was
called Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents,
or DAPA.
Mr. Obama has said he took the action after
years of frustration with Republicans in
Congress who had repeatedly refused to
support bipartisan Senate legislation to
update immigration laws. A coalition of 26
states, led by Texas, promptly challenged the
plan, accusing the president of ignoring
administrative procedures for changing rules
and of abusing the power of his office by
circumventing Congress.
“Today’s decision keeps in place what we
have maintained from the very start: One
person, even a president, cannot unilaterally
change the law,” Ken Paxton, the Texas
attorney general, said in a statement after the
ruling. “This is a major setback to President
Obama’s attempts to expand executive
power, and a victory for those who believe in
the separation of powers and the rule of law.”

The court did not disclose how the justices
had voted, but they were almost certainly
split along ideological lines. Administration
officials had hoped that Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr. would join the court’s fourmember liberal wing to save the program.
The case hinged in part on whether Texas had
suffered the sort of direct and concrete injury
that gave it standing to sue. Texas said it had
standing because it would be costly for the
state to give driver’s licenses to immigrants
affected by the federal policy.
Chief Justice Roberts is often skeptical of
expansive standing arguments. But it seemed
plain when the case was argued in April that
he was satisfied that Texas had standing,
paving the way for a deadlock.
Mr. Obama said the White House did not
believe the terse ruling from the court had any
effect on the president’s authority to act
unilaterally. But he said the practical effect
would be to freeze his efforts on behalf of
immigrants until after the November
election.
He also predicted that lawmakers would
eventually act to overhaul the nation’s
immigration system.
“Congress is not going to be able to ignore
America forever,” he said. “It’s not a matter
of if; it’s a matter of when. We get these
spasms of politics around immigration and
fear-mongering, and then our traditions and
our history and our better impulses kick in.”
White House officials had repeatedly argued
that presidents in both parties had used
similar executive authority in applying the
nation’s immigration laws. And they said
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Congress had granted federal law
enforcement wide discretion over how those
laws should be carried out.
But the court’s ruling may mean that the next
president will again need to seek a
congressional compromise to overhaul the
nation’s immigration laws. And it left
immigration activists deeply disappointed.
“This is personal,” Rocio Saenz, the
executive vice president of the Service
Employees International Union, said in a
statement. “We will remain at the front lines,
committed to defending the immigration
initiatives and paving the path to lasting
immigration reform.”
The lower court rulings in the case were
provisional, and the litigation will now
continue and may again reach the Supreme
Court when it is back at full strength. In the
meantime, it seems unlikely that the program
will be revived.
In February 2015, Judge Andrew S. Hanen of
Federal District Court in Brownsville, Tex.,
entered a preliminary injunction shutting
down the program while the legal case
proceeded. The government appealed, and a
divided three-judge panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in New Orleans affirmed the injunction.
In their Supreme Court briefs, the states
acknowledged that the president had wide
authority over immigration matters, telling
the justices that “the executive does have
enforcement discretion to forbear from
removing aliens on an individual basis.”
Their quarrel, they said, was with what they
called a blanket grant of “lawful presence” to

millions of immigrants, entitling them to
various benefits.
In response, Solicitor General Donald B.
Verrilli Jr. told the justices that this “lawful
presence” was merely what had always
followed from the executive branch’s
decision not to deport someone for a given
period of time.
“Deferred action does not provide these
individuals with any lawful status under the
immigration laws,” he said. “But it provides
some measure of dignity and decent
treatment.”
“It recognizes the damage that would be
wreaked by tearing apart families,” Mr.
Verrilli added, “and it allows individuals to
leave the shadow economy and work on the
books to provide for their families, thereby
reducing exploitation and distortion in our
labor markets.”
The states said they had suffered the sort of
direct and concrete injury that gave them
standing to sue.
Judge Jerry E. Smith, writing for the majority
in the appeals court, focused on an injury said
to have been suffered by Texas, which he said
would have to spend millions of dollars to
provide driver’s licenses to immigrants as a
consequence of the federal program.
Mr. Verrilli told the justices that Texas’
injury was self-inflicted, a product of its
decision to offer driver’s licenses for less
than they cost to produce and to tie eligibility
for them to federal standards.
Texas responded that being required to
change its laws was itself the sort of harm that
conferred standing. “Such a forced change in
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Texas law would impair Texas’ sovereign
interest in ‘the power to create and enforce a
legal code,’” the state’s lawyers wrote in a
brief.

The appeals court affirmed that ruling and
added a broader one. The program, it said,
also exceeded Mr. Obama’s statutory
authority.

Judge Hanen grounded his injunction on the
Obama administration’s failure to give notice
and seek public comments on its new
program. He found that notice and comment
were required because the program gave
blanket relief to entire categories of people,
notwithstanding
the
administration’s
assertion that it required case-by-case
determinations about who was eligible for the
program.
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“Obama's immigration plan appears to be in trouble after Supreme Court
hearing”
The Los Angeles Times
David G. Savage
April 18, 2016

President Obama's far-reaching plan to ease
life for millions of immigrants in the U.S.
illegally ran into solid conservative
opposition at the Supreme Court on Monday,
putting its fate in doubt.
The administration’s supporters were left to
hope that justices — evenly divided between
Republican and Democratic appointees since
the death of Justice Antonin Scalia — might
dismiss the Texas case on a legal technicality
by finding the state of Texas cannot show it
would be sufficiently harmed by the
president’s program.
But the comments and questions during
Monday’s argument suggested the court’s
four conservatives probably would side with
Texas and 25 other Republican-led states,
while the four liberals would vote to uphold
Obama’s plan.
If so, the 4-4 split would be a defeat for the
administration, keeping in place a federal
judge’s order that has blocked the plan from
taking effect.
At issue is whether the president has the
authority to temporarily remove the threat of
deportation and offer a work permit to more
than 4 million immigrant parents of children

who are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent
residents.
Obama’s lawyers argued that U.S.
immigration laws give the chief executive
broad leeway in deciding whom to deport,
including the authority to take no action
against millions of working immigrants who
have families here and no serious criminal
records.
But in the opening minutes of arguments
Monday, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.
and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said
Obama’s order appeared to go further by in
effect changing the law and reclassifying
millions of immigrants so that they may stay
and work legally in the U.S.
Roberts asked the president’s attorney
whether there were any limits to executive
authority when it comes to deportation.
“Could the president grant deferred removal
to every unlawfully present alien in the
United States?” Roberts asked.
No, replied U.S. Solicitor Gen. Donald
Verrilli Jr., noting that the law still calls for
arresting criminals.
“OK. So not criminals. Who else?” Roberts
continued.
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Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. interjected to say
that, under the administration’s legal theory,
a future president might decide unilaterally
on an “open borders” policy, regardless of
what Congress decided.
Verrilli disagreed. “That’s a million miles
from where we are now,” he said.
Kennedy, whose vote is seen as crucial for
the administration, leaned forward. “Well,
it’s 4 million people from where we are
now,” he said. “What we’re doing is defining
the limits of discretion. And it seems to me
that is a legislative, not executive, act.”
Allowing the president to take the lead in
defining which immigrants can stay is
“backward,” Kennedy said. “The president is
setting the policy and Congress is executing
it. That’s just upside down.”
The sharp exchange served notice that the
court’s conservatives are unlikely to uphold
Obama’s order as being within his executive
authority.
The administration’s fallback argument is
that the case should be dismissed because
Texas suffered no injury and therefore has no
standing to sue. The state has complained it
must shoulder the cost of issuing driver’s
licenses to the immigrants.
Roberts, who has been skeptical of granting
standing to states to challenge federal
policies, said Texas looked to have a real
complaint. “Texas says: Our injury is we
have to give driver’s license here, and that
costs us money,” the chief justice told
Verrilli.

In 2004, eight justices were split over
whether public schools could have students
recite the phrase “one nation under God” in
the Pledge of Allegiance. Scalia had recused
himself, and a tie vote would have affirmed
the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling
that the practice was unconstitutional.
Instead, the justices defused the controversy
by deciding that Michael Newdow, the father
who sued on his daughter’s behalf, did not
have standing.
The most important recent test of a state’s
standing came in 2007 when Massachusetts,
California and a coalition of “blue states”
sued the George W. Bush administration for
failing to take action on climate change under
the Clean Air Act. By a 5-4 vote, the court’s
liberals, joined by Kennedy, upheld the
state’s claim on the theory that rising seas
could damage their coastlines.
Roberts dissented in that case, but he
mentioned the ruling twice Monday. “We
said in Massachusetts vs. EPA that we have a
special solicitude for claims of the states,” he
said, a comment that suggested he was not
ready to throw out the Texas case on
standing.
Thomas Saenz, president of the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, joined Verrilli in support of Obama’s
order, known as Deferred Action for Parents
of Americans and Lawful Permanent
Residents, or DAPA. He said he was there on
behalf of three Texas mothers who seek
“relief from the daily fear they will be
separated from their families and detained or
removed from their homes.”

Standing is sometimes a wild card in cases
over which the justices are deeply divided.
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Arguing on the other side, Texas Solicitor
Gen. Scott Keller called Obama’s order an
“unprecedented unlawful assertion of
executive power” and potentially “one of the
largest changes in immigration policy in our
nation’s history.”
He ran into sharp questions from the court’s
liberal justices. They steadily defended the
president’s executive action and said it was
consistent with past presidents who extended
relief to large groups of immigrants.

“We still go back to the basic problem: 11.3
million people,” said Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg. Congress has not appropriated the
money to arrest and deport millions of
otherwise law-abiding immigrants, she said,
so it makes sense to allow some of them to
work legally and raise families.
The justices will meet this week to discuss the
case and vote on whether to affirm or reverse
the lower court. A decision is likely to be
announced in June.
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“U.S. Supreme Court to decide major case on Obama immigration plan”
Reuters
Lawrence Hurley
January 19, 2016

The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday paved
the way for a major ruling on the limits of
presidential powers, agreeing to decide the
legality of President Barack Obama's
unilateral action to shield more than 4 million
illegal immigrants from deportation.
The court agreed to hear Obama's bid to
resurrect his plan, undertaken in 2014
through executive action bypassing the
Republican-led Congress, that was blocked
last year by lower courts after Texas and 25
other Republican-governed states sued to
stop it. A ruling is due by the end of June.
The case is not the first time Obama has
asked the Supreme Court to rescue a major
initiative. The court in 2012 and 2015
rejected conservative challenges to his
signature healthcare law.
The White House expressed confidence the
court would now deem as lawful Obama's
immigration action, which was crafted to let
millions of illegal immigrants whose children
are American citizens or lawful permanent
residents to get into a program that protects
them from deportation and supplies work
permits.
Texas and the other states contend Obama
exceeded his presidential powers and usurped
the authority of Congress. Texas Attorney

General Ken Paxton, a Republican, said
courts have long recognized the limits to
presidential authority.
"The court should affirm what President
Obama said himself on more than 20
occasions: that he cannot unilaterally rewrite
congressional laws and circumvent the
people's representatives," Paxton said.
The nine justices will review a November
ruling by the New Orleans-based 5th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals that upheld a
February 2015 decision by U.S. District
Judge Andrew Hanen in Brownsville, a city
along the Texas border with Mexico, to halt
Obama's action.
With some of his major legislative initiatives
suffocated by Republican lawmakers, the
Democratic president has resorted to
executive action to get around Congress on
issues including immigration, gun control
and the Obamacare law. The most recent
executive action came this month when he
acted unilaterally to expand background
checks for certain gun purchases.
His executive actions have antagonized
Republicans who accuse him of unlawfully
taking actions by executive fiat that only
Congress can perform.
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The case raises several legal issues, including
whether states have legal standing to sue the
U.S. government over decisions on how to
enforce federal laws.
'FAITHFULLY EXECUTED'
The high court added a separate question on
whether the president's action violated a
provision of the U.S. Constitution that
requires the president to "take care that the
laws be faithfully executed."
The Obama administration called the
president's action mere guidance to
immigration officials on how to exercise
discretion given by Congress on how to
enforce immigration laws.
Obama's action was "consistent with the
actions taken by presidents of both parties,
the laws passed by Congress and the
decisions of the Supreme Court," White
House spokeswoman Brandi Hoffine said.
Those eligible for Obama's program, directed
at illegal immigrants with no criminal record,
would be able to work legally and receive
some federal benefits. States were not
required to provide any benefits. His order
expanded on a 2012 program that provided
similar relief for people who became illegal
immigrants as children.
The case could have repercussions beyond
immigration because it would set a precedent
for the circumstances under which states can
sue the federal government over a range of
executive actions. Future presidents,
Republican or Democratic, could face new
constraints if the states win.
The case is one of the most important the
Supreme Court will decide during its current

term, along with a challenge to a restrictive
Texas abortion law.
If the court sides with Obama, he would have
until his term ends in January 2017 to
implement the immigration plan. With the
U.S. presidential election looming in
November, it would be up to the next
president to decide whether to keep it in
place.
Obama's action came after a bipartisan
immigration policy overhaul bill passed by
the Senate died in the House of
Representatives.
The immigration issue has driven a wedge
between Hispanics, an increasingly important
voting bloc, and Republicans, many of whom
have offered tough words about illegal
immigrants. Most of the estimated 11 million
illegal immigrants are Hispanics, coming
from Mexico and other Latin American
countries.
The ruling is due just months before the
presidential election. The two leading
Democratic presidential hopefuls, Hillary
Clinton and Bernie Sanders, said on Tuesday
the court should uphold Obama's action.
Republican candidates Ted Cruz and Marco
Rubio said as president they would undo
Obama's immigration moves.
Senate Democratic Leader Harry Reid said
Obama’s executive action relied on wellestablished constitutional authority.
He said he recently met with the illegal
immigrant parents of U.S citizens and lawful
permanent residents, saying that "these lawabiding men and women continue to live in
constant fear of being separated from their
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children. These families must be allowed to
step out of the shadows and fully contribute
to the country that they love and call home."
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“A Ruling Against the Obama Administration on Immigration”
The Atlantic
Matt Ford
November 10, 2015

The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
blocked a series of President Obama’s
executive orders on immigration on Monday
night, frustrating the administration’s efforts
to shield millions of undocumented
immigrants from deportation and delivering a
major setback to a core policy initiative of the
president’s second-term agenda.* The Justice
Department said on Tuesday morning that it
would appeal the ruling to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
A three-judge panel ruled against the Obama
administration on a 2-1 vote in Texas v.
United States, upholding a lower court’s
injunction against two programs. Obama
created one of the programs, called Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans, or DAPA,
and expanded another, called Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA in
a unilateral effort to reshape the U.S.
immigration system after the 2014 midterm
elections. Texas and 25 other states sued the
United States soon thereafter, in an attempt to
halt the executive actions.
Since the Constitution grants exclusive
power over immigration law to the federal
government, the states’ lawsuit might seem
quixotic. To circumvent this, Texas and the
other states contend that by granting deferred
action to an estimated five million

undocumented immigrants, the Obama
administration’s executive actions force the
states to either provide services to them or
change their state laws to avoid doing so.
Texas, the only state whose standing was
explicitly recognized by the court,
specifically argued that the immigrants’
“lawful presence” would require the state to
provide them with “state-subsidized driver’s
licenses” and unemployment insurance.
The Obama administration argues that the
changes are well within the executive
branch’s discretionary power to enforce
existing immigration law. But conservative
opponents counter that the executive actions
are an unconstitutional usurpation of
Congress’s power to write American laws.
President Obama announced his policy
change last November after considerable
pressure from immigration-reform activists
and Dreamers and in response to the defeat of
comprehensive immigration reform in
Congress.
In their decision, two judges sided with the
states and the lower court in Texas, citing
both the impact on Texas and the breadth of
the Obama administration's changes as
reasons to uphold the injunction. “At its core,
this case is about the Secretary’s decision to
change the immigration classification of
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millions of illegal aliens on a class-wide
basis,” wrote Judge Jerry Smith in his
majority opinion.
The administration’s interpretation of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act, Smith
wrote, would effectively vest the Secretary of
Homeland Security with the power “to grant
lawful presence and work authorization to
any illegal alien in the United States—an
untenable position in light of the INA’s
intricate
system
of
immigration
classifications and employment eligibility.”
In other words, Smith wrote, “the INA flatly
does not permit the reclassification of
millions of illegal aliens as lawfully present
and thereby make them newly eligible for a
host of federal and state benefits, including
work authorization.”
In her dissent, the third judge, Carolyn King,
counseled judicial restraint in what she
framed as a policy dispute instead of a legal
one. “Because the DAPA Memorandum
contains only guidelines for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion and does not itself
confer any benefits to DAPA recipients, I
would deem this case non-justiciable,” she
wrote. “The policy decisions at issue in this
case are best resolved not by judicial fiat, but
via the political process.”
King then dives into a lengthy, point-by-point
rebuttal of the majority’s interpretation of
Texas’s standing to challenge the executive
actions, their assertion that the creation of
DAPA violated the Administrative Procedure
Act, and their other conclusions about the
case. Her colleagues, in an unusual step,
praised a dissent that strenuously criticized
them. “Our dedicated colleague has penned a
careful dissent, with which we largely but

respectfully disagree,” the other two judges
said in a footnote. “It is well-researched,
however, and bears a careful read.” She did
not reciprocate their praise. “I have a firm and
definite conviction that a mistake has been
made,” King concluded.
The legal saga does not end there. On
Tuesday, the Department of Justice
announced it would seek further review from
the U.S. Supreme Court. In June, my
colleague David Graham wrote about some
activists’ hopes that a Supreme Court
showdown could make immigration reform
the central issue of the 2016 elections.
Advocates hope that such a decision would
make candidates of both parties, but
particularly Republicans, take a stand on a
specific immigration question. Rather than
simply being able to say that they support
comprehensive immigration reform—a
vague statement—they will be asked what
their views are on a clear legal matter, noted
Clarissa Martínez-De-Castro, deputy vice
president of the National Council of La Raza.
The issue plays in down-ballot elections, too.
There are Senate elections in several states
with large Latino populations that are
expected to be close, including Illinois,
Florida, Nevada, and Colorado.
To get the case before the Court this term will
require some alacrity from the Justice
Department. As South Texas College of Law
professor Josh Blackman noted, the Obama
administration is under a tight deadline this
month to ensure the case is decided during the
last full Supreme Court term of his
presidency.
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[Texas’s] brief in opposition must be filed 30
days after the case is “placed on the docket.”
Therefore, if the [Obama administration’s]
cert petition is filed anytime between now
and November 20 or so, Texas’s brief in
opposition would be filed on or before
December 22, and the petition could be
distributed for the January 8 conference.
The only wild card is if Texas either (a)
waives the brief in opposition, forcing the
Court to order them to file one, and thus
stretching the clock or (b) requests an
extension, pushing us past the January 8
conference. But in all likelihood, this case
will be argued the last week in April or the
first week in May of 2016, with a decision in
June 2016.

That assumes that the justices would accept
the case if given the opportunity—a strong
possibility, but a far from certain conclusion.
If the Supreme Court declines to hear the
case, the lower court's preliminary injunction
would stand until the case’s final resolution,
which could come under a new president.
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